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INTRODUCTION 
We are used to thinking about law and religion as presenting questions of church 
and state. On one side, we have the law and the politics that produces law. On the 
other side, we have religious believers and the institutions and communities that they 
create. We then ask ourselves the proper structure of the relationship between church 
and state. When may the law legitimately regulate the religious behavior of the be-
liever? When may the believer infuse the law with religious content through the 
democratic process? Do we believe in strict separation of church and state? The ac-
commodation of religion? Some more dramatic vision such as theocracy or laïcité? 
The structures of these debates are well established, and the minuet of argument and 
counterargument has largely been choreographed. Framing law and religion as a 
question of church and state, however, obscures the fact that increasingly questions 
involving law and religion play out in a particular context, namely the market.1 
Adam Smith declared that mankind has a natural tendency to “truck [and] barter.”2 
Markets, however, are not natural. Rather, they are social achievements, achieve-
ments that rest on an intricate web of norms and institutions. Much of our law is thus 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * Copyright © 2017 Nathan B. Oman. 
 † Rita Anne Rollins Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I would like to 
thank Angela Banks, Sam Brunson, Tara Grove, Michael Helfand, Alli Larsen, James Stern, 
and Tim Zick for detailed comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I also benefited from 
comments at faculty workshops at Washington University in St. Louis and William & Mary 
Law School. All errors remain, of course, my sole responsibility. Bria Cunningham and Evan 
Feely provided excellent research assistance. As always, I thank Heather. 
 1. See generally Nathan B. Oman, The Need for a Law of Church and Market, 64 DUKE 
L.J. ONLINE 141 (2015). 
 2. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 17 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. Chi. Press 1976) (1776). 
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devoted to constructing the market. Likewise, the central legal debates of the last 
century have been dominated by the question of the extent to which market activity 
should be controlled by state actors.3 In short, the law is not neutral or irrelevant to 
the shape of the market. What is the proper relationship between religion and the 
market? Current cases testify that this is hotly contested ground.4 Because the law 
cannot but shape the form of the market, it also cannot but structure the relationship 
between religion and commerce. What should be the structure and content of that 
relationship? 
Answering the question of how the law ought to structure the relationship between 
religion and the market requires that we address the issue directly. On the whole, 
however, legal intellectuals have asked this question only obliquely.5 Hence, we have 
debates about whether corporations can exercise religion,6 or else conflicts over the 
proper place of religion in the market are crammed awkwardly into narratives about 
constitutional law and the rise of the modern regulatory state. The problem with such 
approaches is that they clutter the question of how the law should structure the rela-
tionship between religion and the market with extraneous concerns to the point where 
the issue is seen only in a glass darkly, if at all. This Article seeks to move this dis-
cussion forward in two ways: First, it explicitly articulates three competing norma-
tive visions of how the law could structure the relationship between religion and the 
marketplace. Second, it applies these theories to a concrete and current conflict over 
the relationship between commerce and religious faith. 
Perhaps the most hotly contested question of law, commerce, and religion today 
centers on the conflicts between religious believers and antidiscrimination laws cre-
ated by the advent of same-sex marriage. The last two decades have seen a sea change 
in American attitudes toward same-sex marriage. Most dramatically, the Supreme 
Court declared in Obergefell v. Hodges that gays and lesbians have a constitutional 
right to marry their partners.7 Despite this shift, however, many Americans continue 
to have strong religious objections to same-sex marriage. Conflicts arise when these 
                                                                                                                 
 
 3. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 
(2002) (discussing the many legal and policy disputes revolving around economic issues); 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937 (1991) (same). 
 4. See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 
S. Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015) (presenting the question of whether Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act requires a retailer to accommodate a Muslim employee who wishes to wear a hijab in 
violation of the company’s dress code); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 
2787 (2014) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (holding that religious employers could claim an ex-
emption from the mandate to provide certain forms of contraception to employees). 
 5. There are, of course, some notable exceptions. See, e.g., Michael A. Helfand & Barak 
D. Richman, The Challenge of Co-Religionist Commerce, 64 DUKE L.J. 769, 770 (2015); 
Bernadette Meyler, Commerce in Religion, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887, 891 (2009); Mark 
L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?, 21 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 59, 62 (2013). 
 6. See Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory 
of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations Are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 273, 
274 (2014); James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565, 1568 
(2013); Mark Tushnet, Do For-Profit Corporations Have Rights of Religious Conscience?, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 70, 70 (2013). 
 7. See 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). 
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religious objectors operate businesses that same-sex couples call upon to assist in 
celebrating their weddings. For some religious believers such involvement consti-
tutes unacceptable complicity in a ceremony to which they have deep religious ob-
jections. When the businesses in question, however, are subject to antidiscrimination 
laws covering sexual orientation, the refusal to provide services to a gay or lesbian 
couple is a legal wrong that can give rise to substantial fines and money damages. 
This debate has been fought using the familiar language of church and state. How-
ever, it represents more than a fight over the limits of religious liberty. Because the 
religious objectors are also commercial actors operating within a market, the debate 
raises the broader question of the proper role of religion in the market. It thus pro-
vides a useful case study on this broader question. 
This Article addresses the question of law, religion, and the market directly. It 
does so by developing three theories of how one might conceptualize the proper re-
lationship between commerce and religion. The first two theories I offer are not 
meant to be summaries of any position explicitly articulated by any particular 
thinker. There is a paucity of explicit reflection on the question of markets and reli-
gion and virtually no effort to generate broad legal theories of that relationship.8 Ra-
ther, these theories are an attempt to explicitly articulate clusters of intuitions that 
seem to travel together. My hope is to show that these largely inchoate intuitions 
have a coherent structure and that it is easier to work out their implications and judge 
their merits when they are explicitly articulated. Any such attempt, of course, runs 
the risk of creating a straw man. My hope is that the gains in clarity and simplicity 
justify running that risk. Furthermore, I believe that something like one of these two 
theories forms the basic assumptions of most of those involved in debates at the in-
tersections of law, religion, and commerce. The third approach, which I label the 
doux-commerce theory, builds on arguments that I have advanced elsewhere.9 Doux 
commerce means “sweet commerce.” The theory harks back to eighteenth-century 
theorists of the market such as Montesquieu and Adam Smith who lauded the social 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. There is, of course, a religious literature offering theological reflections on commer-
cial life. See, e.g., MICHAEL NOVAK, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM (Madison Books 
1991) (1982); MAXIME RODINSON, ISLAM AND CAPITALISM (Brian Pearce trans., Saqi Books 
2007) (1966). Likewise, since Max Weber offered his theory of economic development in 
Protestantism and the Spirit of Capitalism, economic historians have also generated a litera-
ture on the role of religion in commercial life. See MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND 
THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans., Routledge 1992) (1930); see also Ephraim 
Fischoff, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: The History of a Controversy, 11 
SOC. RES. 53, 53–54 (1944). What is lacking is a literature by legal scholars explicitly asking 
the normative question of how the law ought to structure the relationship between religion and 
markets. 
 9.  See NATHAN B. OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE: MARKETS AND THE MORAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW (2016); Nathan B. Oman, Markets as a Moral Foundation 
for Contract Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 183 (2012); cf. DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, BOURGEOIS 
DIGNITY: WHY ECONOMICS CAN’T EXPLAIN THE MODERN WORLD 40–47 (2010) (“Markets and 
innovation . . . are consistent with an ethical life.”); DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE BOURGEOIS 
VIRTUES: ETHICS FOR AN AGE OF COMMERCE 1–8 (2006) (“The claim here is that modern capi-
talism does not need to be offset to be good. Capitalism can on the contrary be virtuous.”); 
Donald McCloskey, Bourgeois Virtue, 63 AM. SCHOLAR 177, 182 (1994). 
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and political effects of markets.10 I offer it as an attractive alternative to the other two 
approaches. 
To those familiar with the debates on law and religion, my discussion in this 
Article will seem oddly truncated. I will not discuss questions of constitutional doc-
trine. I will not address myself to the institutional issue of whether this question 
should be resolved by courts or legislatures. This is a deliberate choice. These are all 
important questions, but they are not the question that I am answering in this Article. 
Rather, my goal is to keep the basic normative issue of the market’s proper structure 
and religion’s relationship to commerce in the foreground. Based on a theory of re-
ligion’s role in a well-functioning market, how should this conflict be resolved? The 
other questions can be left for another day. 
The first approach is what I label the public theory of the market. It posits that 
norms of equal respect associated with liberal democratic institutions should be ex-
tended to market actors. On the question of religious objectors to same-sex marriage 
and antidiscrimination laws, its implications are incoherent or at least indeterminate. 
Partisans of both antidiscrimination laws and religious exemptions can invoke 
equally plausible arguments based on equality and dignity in favor of their positions. 
I label the second approach the private theory of the market. It posits that any market 
outcome is legitimate so long as it results from voluntary contracts. This counsels 
against antidiscrimination laws in general, but provides no particular justification for 
religious exemptions.  
The doux-commerce theory I advance sees markets as serving an important public 
function in managing religious, ethnic, and ideological pluralism and fostering an 
ethic of peaceful cooperation. Markets are unable to perform these functions, how-
ever, if they are dominated by the norms we rightly impose on democratic institu-
tions, if they are segregated on tribal lines, or if some groups are systematically ex-
cluded from meaningfully participating in commerce. Accordingly, the case for both 
antidiscrimination laws and religious exemptions is empirically contingent. Aggres-
sive antidiscrimination laws may be necessary to ensure meaningful access to the 
market, but where instances of religious discrimination are uncommon, there is no 
compelling justification for punishing idiosyncratic religious behavior. Indeed, doing 
so will tend to degrade the value of markets. The great advantage of this approach is 
that it avoids the need to adjudicate between dueling claims to injured dignity. Gay 
or lesbian couples insist that any religious exemption from antidiscrimination laws 
fails to treat them with the respect to which they are entitled. Religious believers, in 
turn, claim that punishing them for refusing to violate their consciences fails to treat 
them with respect. Requiring that they abandon their religious convictions or aban-
don their profession is an affront to their dignity. The doux-commerce theory does 
not require that we resolve this intractable dispute. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on the rise of same-
sex marriage and the conflict between antidiscrimination laws and religious objec-
tors. Part II articulates and analyzes the public theory of the market and the private 
                                                                                                                 
 
 10. See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller 
& Harold Samuel Stone eds. & trans., 1989); SMITH, supra note 2. For the canonical scholarly 
treatment of the history of the doux-commerce argument, see generally ALBERT O. 
HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM 
BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH (1977). 
2017] LIMITS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW  697 
 
theory of the market. Part III offers the doux-commerce theory as an alternative, ap-
plies it to the debate over same-sex weddings and antidiscrimination laws, and con-
siders objections and possible responses. The Article then concludes. 
I. RELIGION, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, AND THE SCOPE OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 
The last two decades have seen a dramatic shift in American attitudes towards 
same-sex marriage and homosexuality. When he ran for president in 2008, Barack 
Obama was on the record as opposing the legal recognition of same-sex marriage, a 
position that he said was based in part on his Christian religious beliefs.11 In 2012, 
he publically shifted his position, announcing that he now supported same-sex mar-
riage.12 His shifting opinions mirror those of many in the United States. Gallup began 
tracking American attitudes towards same-sex marriage in 1996.13 In that year, 27% 
of Americans supported legal recognition for same-sex marriage while 68% opposed 
it.14 By 2014, 55% supported legal recognition while 42% opposed it.15 In 2015, 
twelve states (and the District of Columbia) had adopted same-sex marriage either 
by ballot initiative or legislation.16 In five states, the state supreme court had held 
that same-sex marriage is mandated as a matter of state constitutional law.17 Finally, 
the Supreme Court held in Obergefell v. Hodges that the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires all states to recognize and solemnize same-sex marriages.18 Despite this shift 
in laws and attitudes, however, a very sizeable minority of the population remains 
opposed to same-sex marriage or is deeply ambivalent about it. Like President 
Obama’s pre-2012 ambivalence, the ground for their opposition tends to be 
religious.19 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. See BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE 
AMERICAN DREAM 222–24 (2006). 
 12. Phil Gast, Obama Announces He Supports Same-Sex Marriage, CNN (May 9, 2012, 
9:57 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/09/politics/obama-same-sex-marriage/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/JR6F-UV8G]. 
 13. See Justin McCarthy, Same-Sex Marriage Support Reaches New High at 55%, 
GALLUP (May 21, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/169640/sex-marriage-support-reaches 
-new-high.aspx [https://perma.cc/8UCY-2RHT]. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 26, 2015), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc 
/6R4B-CYE9]. 
 17. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. 
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 
948 (Mass. 2003); Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336, 367 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
2013); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 889 (N.M. 2013). 
 18. See 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604, 2607–08 (2015). 
 19. For example, among the religiously unaffiliated support for same-sex marriage is (as 
of 2016) 80%, among white mainline Protestants and Catholics it is 64% and 58% respec-
tively, among black Protestants it is 39%, and among white Evangelical Protestants it is 27%. 
Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. RELIGION & PUB. LIFE (May 12, 2016), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2016/05/12/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/ [https://perma.cc 
/ZK49-Y3M5]; see also Kelly Catherine Chapman, Note, Gay Rights, the Bible, and Public 
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Sexual orientation is not a protected category under federal antidiscrimination 
legislation,20 although the EEOC recently claimed it has jurisdiction to decide em-
ployment discrimination claims based on sexual orientation under Title VII.21 The 
EEOC’s position, however, has been rejected by all of the circuit courts of appeal 
that have addressed the issue.22 There has also been executive action extending anti-
discrimination protections in federal employment to gays and lesbians.23 In addition, 
numerous states and municipalities have passed laws protecting gays and lesbians 
from discrimination in employment, housing, and/or public accommodations.24 In 
                                                                                                                 
 
Accommodations: An Empirical Approach to Religious Exemptions for Holdout States, 100 
GEO. L.J. 1783, 1795–1803 (2012) (discussing the role of religion and the passage of public 
accommodations laws covering sexual orientation). 
 20. See 1 SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW § 6:1 (Karen Moulding ed. 2015) (“Unless 
there is specific state or local legislation laws [sic] specifically that proscribees [sic] discrimi-
nation in employment against lesbians, and gays, bisexual or transgender . . . people in em-
ployment (and very little such legislation exists), such discrimination is not unlawful.”). But 
see infra note 24 (listing numerous state antidiscrimination laws covering sexual orientation). 
 21. See Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *4–6 
(July 15, 2015), https://www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120133080.pdf [https://perma.cc/LPW6 
-GSCX] (reasoning that because sexual orientation is inherently a “sex-based consideration[],” 
Title VII covers sexual orientation discrimination claims as sex discrimination). 
 22. See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006) (recognizing 
that sexual orientation is not a protected classification under Title VII); Medina v. Income 
Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005) (same); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 
398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005) (same); Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 951 
(7th Cir. 2002) (same); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 
2001) (same); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); 
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) (same); 
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) (same); Williamson v. 
A.G. Edwards and Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) (same); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 
597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) (same). 
 23. See Exec. Order No. 13,087, 3 C.F.R., 1999 Comp., p. 191 (1998). Similar protections 
have been created by executive order under antidiscrimination laws governing federal pro-
curement. See Exec. Order No. 13,672, 3 C.F.R., 2014 Comp., p. 28283 (2014). 
 24. In 1977 the District of Columbia was the first major American jurisdiction to pass a 
nondiscrimination law covering sexual orientation. See Human Rights Act of 1977, 24 D.C. 
Reg. 2830 (Sept. 28, 1977). Sixteen states have followed the District since then, banning dis-
crimination in one or more of the following areas: employment, housing, public accommoda-
tions, and other areas. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-502, -601 (2015); Act of April 23, 
2009, Pub. Act No. 09-13, § 3, 2009 Conn. Acts 78, 79 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 46b-20); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 46034604 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711 
(Supp. 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2 (West Supp. 2015); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 489-3 (West 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 515-3 (West Supp. 2015); 775 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/1-102(A) (West Supp. 2016); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424.1 (LexisNexis 
2014); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-304, -606, -705 (LexisNexis 2014 & Supp. 2015); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.08, .09, .11(1), .16(1) (West 2012 & Supp. 2016); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 118.020 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.330 (LexisNexis 
2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651.070 (LexisNexis 2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-
A:6, :7, :8, :10, :16, :17 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (Supp. 2015); N.Y. CIV. 
RIGHTS LAW § 40-c (McKinney 2009); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 313 (McKinney 2009); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 659.850(1) (2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030, .403 (2015); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS 
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some jurisdictions, this latter category is extended beyond its traditional meaning. 
Under federal antidiscrimination laws, public accommodations include only hotels, 
restaurants, and places of public entertainment.25 It does not include retailers or other 
businesses generally open to the public.26 However, many state and local anti-
discrimination laws cover all businesses open to the public.27 These laws have cre-
ated conflicts with business owners that object on religious grounds to participation 
in same-sex nuptials. In Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, a New Mexico wedding 
photographer ran afoul of state antidiscrimination laws when she refused to photo-
graph a same-sex wedding, citing religious objections.28 In Oregon, a baker with 
similar religious objections was fined $135,000 for refusing to bake a wedding cake 
for a same-sex couple.29 
These and other cases have led to calls to amend antidiscrimination laws to allow 
for religious exemptions or to include such exemptions in any new antidiscrimination 
laws. In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Employment Division v. 
Smith,30 Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which in-
structs courts to apply a strict scrutiny balancing test to laws that burden religious 
                                                                                                                 
 
§ 11-24-2 (2002); 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5.1-8 (2003 & Supp. 2015); 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
34-37-4 (2011); Antidiscrimination and Religious Freedom Amendments, 2015 Utah Laws 
68; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4502(a), 4503 (2014 & Supp. 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 
495(a) (2009 & Supp. 2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180 (West 2008); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 49.60.222 (West Supp. 2016); Act of Mar. 2, 1982, ch. 112, 1981 Wis. Sess. 
Laws 901; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.31(2) (West Supp. 2015). 
 25. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2012) (“Each of the following establishments which serves 
the public is a place of public accommodation . . . any inn, hotel, motel . . . ; any restaurant, 
cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in 
selling food for consumption on the premises . . . ; any motion picture house, theater, concert 
hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and any establishment 
which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered . . . 
and which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment.”). 
 26. The Supreme Court, however, has held that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 does gener-
ally prohibit discrimination on the basis of race in private contracting. See Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968). However, this prohibition does not extend to religion, 
national origin, or other categories protected under the 1964 Civil Rights Act and other federal 
antidiscrimination laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012) (“All persons within the jurisdiction 
of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce 
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .”). 
 27. For example, California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act covers “all business establishments 
of every kind whatsoever.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (West 2016). Indeed, it bans not only 
discrimination against customers seeking services from businesses open to the public, but also 
states, “No business establishment of any kind whatsoever shall discriminate against, boycott 
or blacklist, or refuse to buy from, contract with, sell to, or trade with any person in this state 
on account of any [protected] characteristics.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.5(a) (West 2007). 
 28. 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013) (holding that there was no constitutional objection to the 
application of the antidiscrimination ordinance and that New Mexico’s religious freedom act 
did not apply to the case). 
 29. See Shelby Sebens, Judge: Oregon Bakery Should Pay Gay Couple $135,000 over 
Wedding Cake, REUTERS (Apr. 28, 2015, 4:45 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa 
-oregon-gaymarriage-idUSKBN0NJ2JE20150428 [https://perma.cc/9LXP-KFS2]. 
 30. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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exercise.31 RFRA alone has never been used successfully to challenge federal anti-
discrimination laws, and after the Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, it does 
not apply to state laws.32 Numerous state legislatures, however, have passed their 
own versions of RFRA, which do apply to state laws.33 To date, no state RFRA has 
been interpreted to grant an exemption from a state antidiscrimination law covering 
sexual orientation.34 In the Elane Photography case, the New Mexico Supreme Court 
held that New Mexico’s RFRA did not apply to private causes of action.35 In re-
sponse, Arizona sought to amend its state RFRA to explicitly include private suits.36 
While Arizona has no statewide law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation, the proposed amendment was widely seen as taking aim at anti-
discrimination laws—although it did not mention them. The resulting public outcry 
against efforts to “license discrimination” included calls to boycott the state, and 
Arizona’s governor vetoed the law.37 Indiana, which also does not have a statewide 
antidiscrimination law covering sexual orientation, passed a state RFRA that covered 
private causes of action.38 Again there was a national outcry resulting in calls to 
boycott the state, and the state legislature and governor quickly adopted an 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012). See generally Thomas C. Berg, What 
Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 
VILL. L. REV. 1 (1994) (discussing the background and effect of RFRA); Christopher L. 
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Un-
constitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994) (same); Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, 
Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209 (1994) (same). 
 32. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that RFRA as applied 
to the states exceeds congressional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment). RFRA was 
used successfully in a challenge to the application of Title VII to a religious university’s canon 
law department. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 
(D.C. Cir. 1996). The court in that case, however, also rested its opinion on the First 
Amendment. Cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t 
Opportunity Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707 (2012) (holding that the Religion Clauses created 
a ministerial exception from antidiscrimination laws). The Court has held that RFRA contin-
ues to apply to federal laws. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 
546 U.S. 418, 423 (2006). 
 33. See W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, 1 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW 
§ 2:63, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2014) (collecting statutory references). 
 34. In his study of state court decisions under state RFRAs, Christopher Lund concluded 
that the statutes had generally been interpreted very narrowly and on the whole were in-
effective at granting religious believers exemptions from otherwise applicable laws. See 
Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. 
REV. 466, 467 (2010). 
 35. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 76–77 (N.M. 2013). 
 36. See S. 1062, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2014) (providing that a person could assert 
the defense “regardless of whether the government is a party to the proceeding”); see also 
Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 631–33 (2015) (providing additional infor-
mation on the Arizona proposal). 
 37. See Catherine E. Shoichet & Halimah Abdullah, Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer Vetoes 
Controversial Anti-Gay Bill, SB 1062, CNN (Feb. 26, 2014, 11:13 PM), http://www.cnn.com 
/2014/02/26/politics/arizona-brewer-bill/index.html [https://perma.cc/U2YX-PVWU]. 
 38. See Act of Mar. 26, 2015, Pub. L. No. 3-2015, § 1, 2015 Ind. Acts 6, 8. 
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amendment exempting antidiscrimination laws from the coverage of the state’s 
RFRA.39 Similar state-RFRA controversies have played out in other states.40 
Not surprisingly, these policy debates have spawned a law review literature on 
both sides of the issue.41 Andrew Koppelman argues that antidiscrimination law is 
primarily an exercise in social engineering, ensuring access to the market and chang-
ing social norms.42 He rejects the notion that discrimination is an individualized 
harm, such as a classic tort, and favors religious accommodations because such ac-
commodations do not threaten the structure of antidiscrimination laws.43 Other schol-
ars, in contrast, have argued that respect for the dignity of LGBT citizens requires 
that there be no religious exemptions from antidiscrimination laws.44 Such exemp-
tions, they argue, threaten the psychological well-being of gays and lesbians.45 On 
the other side of the debate, Thomas Berg has noted the similarities between the 
claims of religious conscience and the gay-rights critique of the closet.46 Both im-
pulses arise from a desire to live authentically in the public sphere. Both reject the 
notion that others may demand that core aspects of one’s identity—sexuality and 
religion—be kept out of view in a private space.47 Berg accordingly argues in favor 
of generous exemptions for religious objectors.48  
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. See Act of Apr. 2, 2015, Pub. L. No. 4-2015, 2015 Ind. Acts 9; see also Koppelman, 
supra note 36, at 635–36 (discussing the background to the law as amended). 
 40. See Koppelman, supra note 36, at 631–38. 
 41. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims 
Have in Common, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206 (2010); Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and 
Conflicting Liberties, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING 
CONFLICTS 123 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 
2008); Douglas W. Kmiec, Same-Sex Marriage and the Coming Antidiscrimination 
Campaigns Against Religion, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING 
CONFLICTS, supra, at 103; Koppelman, supra note 36; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-
Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 274 (2010); Louise 
Melling, Religious Refusals to Public Accommodations Laws: Four Reasons to Say No, 38 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 177 (2015); Laura S. Underkuffler, Odious Discrimination and the 
Religious Exemption Question, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2069 (2011). 
 42. See Koppelman, supra note 36, at 620, 627. 
 43. See id. at 620. 
 44. See Melling, supra note 41, at 190 (“Anti-discrimination laws are fundamentally a 
way of according recognition, of embracing and opening the doors to those traditionally ex-
cluded.”); Underkuffler, supra note 41, at 2088 (“Laws that prohibit discrimination against 
gay men and lesbian women, in all aspects of their lives, attempt to ‘foster[] . . . individual 
dignity, . . . creat[e] . . . a climate and environment in which each individual can utilize his or 
her potential . . . , and [ensure] equal protection’ of the laws.”) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 37 (D.C. 
1987)). 
 45. See Melling, supra note 41, at 190–91 (“It takes only one such experience, sanctioned 
by the law, to make an LGBT person think that the promise of equality is not real.”). 
 46. See Berg, supra note 41, at 218. 
 47. See id. at 207–08. 
 48. See id. at 208. Chai Feldblum also notes the affinity between the claims of religious 
objectors—what she calls “belief liberty”—and arguments offered by gay-rights advocates but 
concludes that in all but a few very limited cases, religious objectors should not be accommo-
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This debate extends beyond questions of church and market. Some of the actors 
that might claim religious exemptions are nonprofit entities that are involved only 
indirectly in commerce.49 Most of these cases, however, involve for-profit busi-
nesses. The argument has invoked the classical debates over church and state. In 
making their arguments, however, scholars and others often reference the commer-
cial status of the participants and the fact that they have chosen to operate in the 
market. Consider Chai Feldblum, who writes:  
Once an individual chooses to enter the stream of economic commerce 
by opening a commercial establishment, I believe it is legitimate to re-
quire that they play by certain rules. If the government tolerated the pri-
vate exclusionary policies of such individuals in the commercial sector, 
such toleration would necessarily come at the cost of gay people’s sense 
of belonging and safety in society. Just as we do not tolerate private racial 
beliefs that adversely affect African-Americans in the commercial arena, 
even if such beliefs are based on religious views, we should similarly not 
tolerate private beliefs about sexual orientation and gender identity that 
adversely affect the ability of LGBT people to live in the world.50 
Notice that for Feldblum’s position the commercial status of the religious objectors 
is key to weakening their right to act in accordance with their religious beliefs. Like-
wise, she conceptualizes the market as a place where gay people are entitled to be 
shielded from certain kinds of religious beliefs. Presumably, for example, she does 
not believe that a similar legal entitlement should govern the noncommercial activi-
ties of churches. In short, her argument assumes an ideal relationship between reli-
gion and the market, a relationship that the law must define and police.51 This only 
partially articulated ideal does much of the normative work in her argument. Unfor-
tunately, she does not fully articulate the theory of church and market that supports 
her conclusions. Similar assumptions about the proper relationship of religion and 
                                                                                                                 
 
dated. See Feldblum, supra note 41, at 149–55. In contrast, Laura S. Underkuffler acknowl-
edges the connection between identity and behavior with regard to sexual identity but not re-
ligion. See Underkuffler, supra note 41, at 2082 (“Conduct may be a part of gay or lesbian 
sexual orientation, but that conduct is simply an expression of who that person is.”). 
 49. See Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, OAL Dkt. No. CRT 6145-09 
(N.J. Office of Admin. Law, Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.aclu-nj.org/files/8713/2639/9826 
/CRT_6145-09_Bernstein_ID.pdf [https://perma.cc/A52H-S5AY] (involving an ocean-side 
pavilion operated by a self-described ministry associated with the Methodist Church). 
 50. Feldblum, supra note 41, at 153 (footnote omitted). 
 51. Feldblum is certainly not alone in tying the legitimacy of denying religious exemp-
tions to antidiscrimination laws to the market context of religious actors. See, e.g., Mark 
Hager, Freedom of Solidarity: Why the Boy Scout Case Was Rightly (but Wrongly) Decided, 
35 CONN. L. REV. 129, 159–61 (2002) (arguing that commercial entities should not be able to 
assert expressive association exemptions from antidiscrimination laws); Maureen E. Markey, 
The Landlord/Tenant Free Exercise Conflict in a Post-RFRA World, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 487, 
543 (1998) (“Landlord/tenant-free exercise conflicts are different from the usual free exercise 
claim for a number of reasons. These conflicts always involve a landlord who voluntarily en-
gages in a regulated commercial activity, not for religious, but for profit-making purposes.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
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market are at work in the arguments of others. How this relationship might be ex-
plicitly conceptualized is the issue to which I turn in the next sections. 
II. THE PUBLIC THEORY OF THE MARKET AND 
THE PRIVATE THEORY OF THE MARKET 
This Part presents two theories of the market and how commerce and religion 
ought to be related to one another. It then applies each of these theories to the ques-
tion of whether those with religious objections to same-sex marriage should be 
granted exemptions from antidiscrimination laws when those laws require that they 
assist with same-sex weddings. The first is what I label the public theory. It posits 
that ideally markets ought to embody the values associated with liberal democracy 
so that powerful market institutions should be treated as closely analogous to govern-
ment institutions. This implies that religion is both entitled to special protection 
within the market, and that its power should be limited. I label the second approach 
the private theory of the market. This theory is substantively indifferent to the role 
of religion in the market, so long as market outcomes result from contractual arrange-
ments free of force and fraud. 
A. The Public Theory of the Market 
The public theory of the market takes the relationship between the state and citi-
zens in a well-functioning liberal democracy as the model for structuring the market. 
In the liberal tradition, the legitimacy of the state’s power rests on two conditions. 
First, the state is accountable to citizens collectively for its actions. It is a government 
“of the people, by the people, for the people.”52 Its actions are their actions, the ex-
pression of their collective will exercised after due deliberation. Second, the state is 
to lavish equal respect and concern on its citizens. There is no privileged class nor is 
there any caste of underlings.53 All are equal before the law, and all laws are to be 
framed so as to benefit the public good. In practice, of course, the benefits and bur-
dens of laws will fall unequally, but when those burdens are systematically allocated 
to groups based on immutable characteristics or basic aspects of individual identity 
—race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion—then the law is presumptively il-
legitimate.54 Beyond the formal equality of the law, a well-functioning liberal de-
mocracy is supposed to provide social equality, or at the very least, a society in which 
opportunity is open to all and none can claim special advantages based upon acci-
dents of birth. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 52. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, November 19, 1863, in 
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS: 1859–1865, at 536 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) (the text of the 
Gettysburg Address). 
 53. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 87–88 (rev. ed. 1999) (“Aristocratic and caste 
societies are unjust because they make these contingencies [of birth] the ascriptive basis for 
belonging to more or less enclosed and privileged social classes.”). 
 54. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (arguing 
that courts should impose heightened scrutiny when laws unduly burden “discrete and insular 
minorities”). See generally Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the 
Carolene Products Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163 (2004). 
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When the norms of democratic liberalism are taken as the benchmark of legiti-
macy, the unregulated market appears problematic. The shape of such a market is 
emergent rather than deliberative. It is not the result of debate and democratic deci-
sions. Furthermore, the ebb and flow of business within the market can leave some 
actors with more power than other actors. On this view, employers are more powerful 
than employees, businesses are more powerful than consumers, and corporations are 
more powerful than individuals. These asymmetries of power are like the asymmetry 
in liberal-political theory between the power of the state and the power of individuals. 
Just as the asymmetry between government and citizen requires that the state be sub-
ject to limitations on its power and norms of equality, powerful economic actors 
should be subject to regulations that impose similar public values on their activities.55 
Thus beginning in the Progressive Era and continuing through the New Deal to the 
present, one of the central ambitions behind the construction of the modern regula-
tory state has been to make the market more liberal and more democratic in its oper-
ation, constraining the power of private and democratically unaccountable market 
actors. 
Religion occupies an ambivalent position in liberal-democratic theory and like-
wise has an ambivalent position in the public vision of the market.56 On one hand, 
liberal democracy is premised on the brute fact of moral and religious pluralism. 
Public institutions should not embody any particular theological view nor should 
they seek to impose on citizens a comprehensive moral or religious system.57 Fur-
thermore, religion can be seen as an irrational and potentially violent force, one that 
must be constrained and kept away from the levers of state power.58 Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 55. For example, critics of the law’s willingness to enforce boilerplate agreements have 
long suggested that doing so undermines democracy, because large commercial actors are in 
effect authoring laws without democratic accountability. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, 
BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 33–51 (2013); 
Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and 
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971).  
 56. For a good discussion of the problems of religion and modern philosophical discus-
sions of liberalism, see generally ROBERT AUDI, RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR 
REASON (2000). 
 57. Of course, this does not mean that the state must be entirely neutral with regard to 
notions of the good. The prior demands of justice place constraints on visions of the good life 
that citizens may pursue. As two political philosophers put it: 
If some ways of life cannot survive in a society in which everybody has what 
justice demands, and without perfectionist political action on their behalf, then 
that is unfortunate for those who favour such ways of life but no reason for the 
state to help them. Rather, they will have to revise their conception of the good 
to fit the constraints imposed by the priority of the right. 
STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS AND COMMUNITARIANS 31 (1992). 
 58. See AUDI, supra note 56, at 3–4 (“Religion can, however, be a divisive force in demo-
cratic politics. The impulse to pursue the Ultimate Good, particularly in an authoritative in-
stitutional context and with the support of others sharing the same religious outlook, can lead 
to a tendency, conscious or unconscious, to dominate others. A holy cause can sanctify ex-
treme measures.”); Koppelman, supra note 36, at 629 (“Resistance to religious accommoda-
tion has its source in the political left, much of which, largely as a consequence of disputes 
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norms against the establishment of religion and theocracy place limits on the ability 
of the state to enact laws with explicitly religious content.59 At the same time, religion 
can be part of an individual’s core identity, an identity that the state should respect. 
The state may not single out believers on the basis of their religion and in some cases 
may need to limit the law’s reach in order to ensure that believers have the necessary 
freedom to live their religion.60 
For the public theory, the proper reach of antidiscrimination laws is open to a 
vigorous debate. Arguing from broadly similar principles about how the market 
should be structured, proponents of aggressive antidiscrimination laws and generous 
religious exemptions reach very different conclusions. For proponents of anti-
discrimination laws, the market is a public space in which all are entitled to equal 
respect regardless of their race, religion, or sexual orientation. The evil of discrimi-
nation lies in the act of discrimination itself, independent of the question of how 
pervasive the discrimination might be. Hence, the fact that there is no shortage of 
bakers in Portland, Oregon, eager to provide wedding cakes for lesbian nuptials is 
irrelevant. Analogously, the vast majority of government officials do not discrimi-
nate on the basis of race, but this fact would not immunize a single official that did 
discriminate from the censure of the Equal Protection Clause. It is enough that the 
government has failed its obligation to treat its citizens equally regardless of race.61 
Likewise, businesses occupy a position of greater power than their customers. As 
powerful, public institutions, they must exercise that power consistent with funda-
mental liberal-democratic norms. The fact that the business is religiously motivated 
is irrelevant. If anything, the religious motivation makes the conduct of Elane 
Photography LLC or the Portland baker even more suspect. Just as the institutions of 
the state may not be structured on explicitly religious grounds, so also businesses 
cannot be left unfettered to pursue religious goals.62 Religion is perhaps especially 
prone to irrational or illiberal action. Hence, religiously motivated discrimination is 
particularly dangerous because it threatens not only norms of equality but also a pub-
lic space in which powerful institutions cannot exploit their power to advance sec-
tarian interests or threaten a secular public order. 
Religious objectors, however, can also deploy a public vision of the market in 
favor of exemptions from antidiscrimination laws. In a public space, citizens are en-
titled to be treated with dignity by powerful actors. Religious believers cannot be 
                                                                                                                 
 
over sexual ethics, regards religion as a malign force in the world.”). 
 59. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982) (holding that gov-
ernment power may not be delegated to religious bodies). 
 60. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babulu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
546–47 (1993) (holding that laws which single out conduct merely because it is religious must 
satisfy strict scrutiny); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1963) (holding that laws 
incidentally burdening religious conduct were subject to constitutional scrutiny). 
 61. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 62. Justice Ginsburg, for example, has articulated a vision of the market in which busi-
nesses exist for purely secular purposes. “Religious organizations exist to foster the interests 
of persons subscribing to the same religious faith. Not so of for-profit corporations.” Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2795 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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excluded from public life on the basis of religion.63 A key aspect of dignity is the 
ability to live and act authentically.64 Crucially, this includes the ability to act con-
sistently with one’s basic identity in public. We do not respect citizens when we insist 
that their identity is acceptable only so long as it is kept private. Just as society does 
not adequately respect the dignity of gay citizens if it requires that their sexuality 
remain firmly locked in the closet, society is similarly disrespectful of religious be-
lievers when it requires that religious conduct be confined to the closet of private 
spaces. Hence, antidiscrimination laws properly limit the ability of employers to pun-
ish employees who are “too religious” in public, as for example when a Muslim 
woman is prohibited by her employer from wearing a hijab to work.65 Likewise, anti-
discrimination laws threaten the dignity of religious believers who must abandon the 
right to live authentically in accordance with their beliefs as a condition of pursuing 
their chosen employment.66 
The public theory of the market may thus be deployed in favor of both enforce-
ment of and exemption from antidiscrimination laws. When the issue is joined in 
these terms, both sides share the assumption that the market should be structured by 
the law so as to instantiate the values of equal respect and concern that should apply 
to public spaces. At best, the public theory is thus indeterminate. At worst, it is in-
coherent. It is possible, however, to conceptualize the market in ways that reject the 
public theory’s basic assumptions. 
B. The Private Theory of the Market 
The private theory of the market rejects the idea that the norms of a liberal de-
mocracy should form a baseline for legitimate commercial behavior.67 Rather, it 
places primary emphasis on voluntary, private agreement. Indeed, voluntary agree-
ment is seen as more normatively primal than the norms of liberal democracy. Thus, 
the social contract tradition tries to legitimate liberal democracy by recourse to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 627–29 (1978) (holding that states may not pro-
hibit ministers from holding public office); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1961) 
(holding that government office may not be conditioned on beliefs about God). 
 64. See Berg, supra note 41, at 215 (“[R]eligious freedom finds significant justifica-
tion . . . in the importance of religious belief to personal identity.”). 
 65. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015) (presenting the question of whether Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act requires a retailer to accommodate a Muslim employee who wishes to wear a hijab in 
violation of the company’s dress code). 
 66. See Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: 
EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note 41, at 189, 201 (“The result would be to exclude from a 
range of occupations and professions many believers who are unwilling to violate their faith 
commitments. Such occupational exclusions have an odious history. The English Test Acts 
and penal laws long excluded Catholics from a range of occupations . . . .”). 
 67. Richard Epstein has provided the clearest and most forceful critique of anti-
discrimination laws on these grounds. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN 
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992); Richard A. 
Epstein, Public Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Why Freedom of 
Association Counts as a Human Right, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (2014). 
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stories about (admittedly imaginary) private contracts rather than vice versa.68 This 
does not mean that the market should be thought of as an anarchic space, red in tooth 
and claw. Law is necessary to provide an institutional structure in which economic 
life can be ordered by voluntary agreements.69 Tort and criminal law should prohibit 
the use of force and fraud. Property law should provide clear rules about entitlements 
to resources and how those entitlements may be transferred. Contract law should 
foster trust and cooperation by enforcing executory obligations. Other forms of 
regulation may be necessary to overcome difficulties created by externalities, 
holdout situations, natural monopolies, and a host of other problems that inhibit the 
ideal of orderly, voluntary cooperation. Depending on one’s views regarding the 
scope of these problems, the private theory of the market can push in a markedly 
libertarian direction, but it need not.70 If one concludes that the natural impediments 
to a well-functioning, voluntary market are substantial, then one can justify a great 
deal of regulation in the name of constituting the market as a space ordered by private 
agreements. 
The key difference between the private theory of the market and the public theory 
of the market is not necessarily the overall level of regulation. Rather, it is that the 
private view of the market rejects the assumption that in order to be legitimate, mar-
ket institutions should replicate the norms applicable to the liberal-democratic state. 
Importantly, the private theory of the market feels no sense of unease with the fact 
that market processes are emergent rather than deliberative. Collective outcomes 
needn’t be the result of democratic choice to be legitimate. Likewise, even significant 
market actors needn’t be subject to norms of equal concern to be legitimate. Rather, 
the legitimacy of market outcomes rests on the procedural question of whether they 
are the result of choices uninfected by force, fraud, or diminished capacity.71 
Because this theory sees a well-functioning market as emerging from private 
choices, it is likely to be skeptical of claims that the market necessarily leads to vast 
asymmetries of power. For example, one needn’t assume that employers will always 
have more power than employees. Rather, the distribution of power between employ-
ers and employees will depend on the background supply and demand in the labor 
market, which is constantly shifting. Likewise, corporations are not more powerful 
                                                                                                                 
 
 68. See Jean Hampton, Contract and Consent, in A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 379, 379 (Robert E. Goodin & Philip Pettit eds., 1993) (“The contrac-
tarian form of argument became popular in the seventeenth century, and its popularity contin-
ues to this day. Advocates of this approach tell us to resolve answers to moral and political 
issues by asking what a group of rational persons could all agree to, or alternatively, what such 
people would be unreasonable to reject.”). 
 69. See F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 220 (1960) (“The classical argument 
for freedom in economic affairs rests on the tacit postulate that the rule of law should govern 
policy in this as in all other spheres.”). 
 70. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public 
Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205 (2014) (identifying this critique of anti-
discrimination laws with libertarianism). 
 71. Cf. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 147–82 (rev. ed. 2013) (offering 
a historical theory of justice, under which society is judged not by the ultimate distribution of 
resources but whether that distribution results from just acquisitions and transfers of 
resources). 
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than their individual customers so long as those relationships are purely contractual. 
The customer may always take his or her trade elsewhere, and corporations spend 
millions seeking to cater to the desires of consumers, not vice versa. Once-mighty 
firms can be rapidly brought low by competition, and dominant market positions are 
frequently upset by new tastes and technologies.72 To be sure, in any actual market 
the competitive conditions that give employees and consumers the whip hand are 
present to a greater or lesser extent. By and large, however, the private theory of the 
market suggests that the solution to any asymmetries is to foster competition by 
lowering barriers to entry and refusing to protect incumbent firms. 
The private theory of the market suggests that religion in the market is un-
objectionable so long as it is contractual. Religious commercial actors—like other 
market participants—are entitled to have the state enforce their voluntary, private 
arrangements.73 Crucially, however, norms of equality and public deliberation do not 
apply to contractual activity. Hence, a firm should be free to discriminate against 
customers or employees on the basis of religion so long as there is no force or fraud 
involved in its decisions. No market actor has an obligation to contract with any other 
market actor. This would apply both to those that might wish to disfavor an employee 
or employer because of her religious identity, and to a religious employer or business 
that wishes to pursue an illiberal course of action dictated by his religious conscience. 
Likewise, there is no objection to major market actors, such as large corporations, 
pursuing explicitly religious agendas so long as they do so through voluntary con-
tracts.74 Crucially, however, other market actors should be free to refuse to contract 
with religiously motivated or discriminatory businesses.75 Religion, like any other 
                                                                                                                 
 
 72. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 (3d ed. 
1950) (“The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational develop-
ment from the craft shop and factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process 
of industrial mutation—if I may use that biological term—that incessantly revolutionizes the 
economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new 
one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.”) (emphasis in 
original) (footnote omitted). 
 73. Cf. Helfand & Richman, supra note 5, at 773–75 (discussing legal challenges that 
religious actors in the market face in getting their contracts enforced). 
 74. For example, the Islamic finance industry involves an excess of $1 trillion globally, 
but has attracted very little controversy in large part because it overwhelmingly involves 
purely contractual relationships among equally sophisticated parties such as banks, investors, 
and bond-issuing entities. See Mohammed Aly Sergie, The Rise of Islamic Finance, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/economics/rise-islamic-finance 
/p32305 [https://perma.cc/ZE3H-A3GP] (“Global Islamic financial assets have soared from 
less than $600 billion in 2007 to more than $1.3 trillion in 2012, an expansion rooted in the 
growing pool of financial assets in Muslim-majority countries driven by consumer demand for 
products that comply with religious codes.”). See generally MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL, ISLAMIC 
FINANCE: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PRACTICE (2006). 
 75. See Ed Payne, Indiana Pizzeria Finds Itself at the Center of ‘Religious Freedom’ 
Debate, CNN (Apr. 3, 2015, 9:54 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/02/living/indiana-
religious-freedom-pizza-feat [https://perma.cc/Z9ZM-U2VS] (recounting boycotts organized 
against a pizzeria owner who stated that he would not cater a same-sex wedding). But see 
Robby Soave, Boycotts Are Hypocritical, Discriminatory, and Bad for Social Change, 
REASON.COM: HIT & RUN BLOG (Mar. 27, 2015, 4:01 PM), http://social.reason.com/blog/2015 
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activity pursued in the market, must succeed or fail based on its ability to attract 
customers and has no grounds for complaint if it is shunned or boycotted by others. 
While the private theory of the market is hostile to antidiscrimination law in prin-
ciple, it provides no particular reason for granting an exemption for religiously mo-
tivated conduct. Indeed, the private theory views the law’s concern with the sub-
stance of otherwise voluntary transactions as illegitimate. The content of agreements 
should be left to the parties, and there is no reason for the law to inquire into the 
content of transactions once it has determined that there is no force or fraud. To grant 
a religious exemption from antidiscrimination laws would favor religiously moti-
vated commerce precisely because it is religiously motivated.76 Hence, a regime of 
religious exemptions from antidiscrimination laws suffers in part from the same 
problem as the antidiscrimination laws themselves. It judges market choices based 
on their substance rather than their voluntariness. Exemptions can only be justified 
by the private theory of the market, if at all, because they represent a rollback of 
antidiscrimination laws, but it is necessarily an ad hoc and arbitrary rollback of those 
laws. There is nothing in the private theory of the market that suggests that religiously 
motivated commerce is particularly deserving of protection. It is thus equally hostile 
to a religion-protective version of the public theory under which the law should over-
ride private ordering to ensure that the market is a respectful space for religious 
believers.77 
III. DOUX COMMERCE AND THE REACH OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS 
Against the two theories articulated in the previous section, I offer what I label 
the doux-commerce theory. Unlike the private theory, this approach rejects the idea 
that market outcomes are legitimated purely by virtue of being voluntary and con-
tractual. It shares with the public theory a concern for the role of markets in fostering 
a peaceful and pluralistic society. However, in contrast to the public theory, the doux-
commerce theory sees much of the value of markets as lying precisely in the fact that 
they are not formally governed by the norms of liberal democracy. It thus responds 
to weaknesses in both of the alternative approaches. The problem with the public 
                                                                                                                 
 
/03/27/boycotts-are-hypocritical-discriminatory [https://perma.cc/3KMT-2UTU] (offering a 
libertarian critique of boycotts). 
 76. The broadest proposal for such an exemption was passed by the lower house of the 
Kansas legislature, but the Kansas Senate declined to take it up. The law would have provided 
a blanket exemption from antidiscrimination laws based on religious motivations: 
[N]o individual or religious entity shall be required by any governmental entity 
to do any of the following, if it would be contrary to the sincerely held religious 
beliefs of the individual or religious entity regarding sex or gender: (a) Provide 
any services . . . related to, or related to the celebration of, any marriage, domestic 
partnership, civil union or similar arrangement . . . . 
Koppelman, supra note 36, at 631 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. 2453, 2014 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Kan. 2014) (as amended by the House Committee)). 
 77. Cf. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015) (presenting the question of whether Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act requires a retailer to accommodate a Muslim employee who wishes to wear a hijab in 
violation of the company’s dress code). 
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theory is that by insisting on constructing the market around thick norms of dignity, 
equality, and respect, it misses the important work that markets perform in society 
precisely when they are governed by far thinner norms of mutual cooperation. The 
weakness of the private theory is that it ignores the important social and political 
work that markets perform. When commerce is reduced to nothing more than the 
pursuit of private interests, we lack the moral language to identify and articulate this 
work. We are also blinded to the way that the market’s ability to perform this work 
is contingent on the shape of market outcomes as opposed to the purely procedural 
question of whether transactions are voluntary. 
A. The Doux Commerce Theory of the Market 
The doux commerce theory rejects the notion that markets should be structured to 
reflect as much as possible the norms of liberal-democratic institutions. It also rejects 
the private theory’s evaluation of markets purely in terms of the voluntary satisfac-
tion of preferences. Rather, it sees commerce as a distinctive form of social activity, 
one that is separate from politics but that serves important political functions. In 
Montesquieu’s language, commerce tends to “gentle” manners.78  
Commerce is valuable because it is prosocial. Markets foster cooperation between 
strangers, train us to see the world from another’s point of view, and generate wealth, 
which has an ameliorative effect on tribal strife and a host of other social evils.79 
Markets can perform these functions precisely because they are not democratic or 
deliberative institutions. Unlike collective democratic action, collective market ac-
tivity requires unanimity.80 A citizen cannot easily defect from the decision of his 
country to go to war or change the law. It is far easier for an employee, however, to 
find a new employer or for a consumer to select a different provider.81 Market par-
ticipants must, therefore, be far more attuned to the desires of others than political 
                                                                                                                 
 
 78. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 10, at 338 (“[I]t is almost general rule that everywhere 
there are gentle mores, there is commerce and that everywhere there is commerce, there are 
gentle mores.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 79. I have developed these themes at much greater length elsewhere. See supra note 9 and 
accompanying text. 
 80. Of course, markets don’t require literal unanimity in society. Rather, they require una-
nimity among those directly involved in a collective project. This is not true of democratic 
political decisions. The argument in the text relies only on the point that markets require rela-
tively high levels of consensus. 
 81. Of course, an employee’s practical ability to defect will depend on his economic situ-
ation and the availability of alternatives. My claim is not that employees enjoy some kind of 
unfettered freedom. Rather, I’m making the more modest, comparative point that defection 
from the state is far, far more difficult. As David Hume put it: 
Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his 
country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to 
day, by the small wages which he acquires? We may as well assert, that a man, 
by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though 
he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish, 
the moment he leaves her. 
DAVID HUME, Of the Original Contract, in POLITICAL ESSAYS 186, 193 (Knud Haakonssen 
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1772). 
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activists. Such activists always contemplate dragooning objecting citizens into some 
collective project. This is, by definition, what political victory entails in a democratic 
society. My observation here is not meant as a libertarian criticism of democratic 
government. Rather, I wish to emphasize the different set of skills required of suc-
cessful commercial and political actors. 
Markets impose a requirement of persuasion on commercial actors.82 Businesses 
must entice customers, and those seeking goods and services must understand poten-
tial suppliers. Potential employees must persuade employers that they should be 
hired. And so on. To be sure, in modern markets many transactions are impersonal 
and mass-produced. Even such transactions require knowledge of counterparties (a 
fact attested to by the ubiquity of market-research firms), and even impersonal mar-
kets provide frequent opportunities for more personal interactions. In order to entice 
counterparties into a bargain, commercial actors must enter imaginatively into the 
position of the other party. This process fosters skills of mutual comprehension. At 
the same time, market cooperation does not require intense levels of commitment 
and moral agreement. While associating products with a certain diffuse moral 
outlook has become a popular marketing ploy, the vast majority of market transac-
tions do not rest on moral, political, or religious agreement.83 This is good. Indeed, 
part of the virtue of markets is that they are generally not ideologically fraught 
spaces, and it is precisely this blasé attitude toward ethnic, religious, political, and 
moral differences that makes them such powerful engines of peaceful cooperation in 
a pluralistic society.84 
In order for markets to act as incubators of prosocial attitudes and behaviors, they 
must be structured in particular ways. Crucially, they must facilitate trade between 
strangers and trade across boundaries of tribal identity, whether the tribes are consti-
tuted by ethnicity, religion, sexual identity, or political conviction.85 They must be 
largely voluntary and reasonably competitive. A market actor whose counterparties 
have little choice but to deal has far less incentive to enter imaginatively into the 
world of his customers, and, to that extent, commerce will do less to “gentle” his 
manners.86 Likewise, doux commerce requires that markets be widely accessible. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 82. The demandingness of the persuasion requirements imposed on market actors is, of 
course, one of the reasons that democratic government is necessary. Certain kinds of very 
valuable collective projects are simply impossible under the unanimity requirements of 
commerce. 
 83. I might want to buy the world a Coke because I like the message of world peace, but 
Coke and I needn’t have bonds of shared political convictions. Likewise, shopping at Whole 
Foods may be a way of signaling my love of the earth, but customers and employees needn’t 
share the same religion. 
 84. Voltaire provides the classic statement of this position, noting the way that those of 
differing religious persuasions peacefully traded with one another on the Royal Exchange in 
London. VOLTAIRE, Sixth Letter: On the Presbyterians, in PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS 19, 20 
(John Leigh ed., Prudence L. Steiner trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2007) (1733). 
 85. See OMAN, supra note 9, at 23–39 (arguing in part that “well-functioning markets 
cross boundaries created by the communities that define one's basic identity.”). 
 86. A classic Saturday Night Live skit captures this point nicely. Aired in the 1970s before 
the breakup of the telephone monopoly, it takes the form of a mock television ad and shows a 
telephone company employee engaging in various acts of gratuitous mismanagement and la-
ziness, much to the apparent consternation of phone users. The ad then ends with the tagline: 
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Just as trade that is tightly concentrated within a single tribe is less prosocial than 
trade across tribal boundaries, a market from which certain tribes are excluded is 
significantly less valuable than a market to which all have access. At the same time, 
they cannot be made to instantiate the norms of deep, moral recognition or equality 
that characterize the public theory of market without eroding their value as a sphere 
in which contestation over such deep political and moral concerns is muted. 
The doux-commerce theory thus shares with the public theory a concern for the 
role of markets in constituting public life and, in particular, a concern with the prob-
lem of managing conflict and cooperation in a pluralistic society. It rejects the private 
theory’s assumption that once the market has been arranged so as to eliminate force 
and fraud, whatever outcome is produced by the voluntary interactions of the market 
participants is right. The value of markets is not purely procedural. Rather, markets 
are valuable because in the aggregate they can deliver a set of goods that support a 
pluralistic society. Imagine, for example, a world sharply divided into mutually hos-
tile and suspicious tribal groups that refuse to trade with one another. So long as the 
refusal to trade was voluntary and tribal solidarity was not the result of force and 
fraud, the private theory of the market would offer no basis for criticizing such a 
market. From the doux-commerce perspective, however, such a market would be a 
failure, even if it was entirely the result of voluntary transactions. Markets are valu-
able in large part because they facilitate cooperation across such tribal boundaries, 
cooperation that requires a certain blasé attitude toward trading with ideological 
opponents. 
The doux-commerce theory’s attitude toward religion in the market is largely con-
tingent and empirical. Consider a business that is infused with a sense of religious 
purpose or identity, such as a kosher butcher or a religious publishing house directed 
towards a particular sectarian audience.87 Such firms will cater largely to a particular 
tribe, and to that extent their commerce will provide less social lubricant in the face 
of pluralism. However, they will also deal with large numbers of non-co-
religionists.88 Even if the butcher sells his meat only to Jews, he may purchase ani-
mals for the slaughter from a gentile farmer.89 Likewise, the religious publisher will 
deal with a secular printer to produce its volumes. Pursuing religious goals through 
the market is thus more prosocial than pursuing those religious goals through alter-
native methods that involve less cooperation across tribal lines. The church that hires 
a printer not of its faith to produce volumes of scripture fosters ties across tribal 
frontiers in a way that it does not when it produces the volumes itself.90  
                                                                                                                 
 
“We don’t care. We don’t have to. We’re the Phone Company.” Saturday Night Live: Season 
2, Episode 1 (NBC television broadcast Sept. 18, 1976), https://www.youtube.com/watch 
?v=CHgUN_95UAw [https://perma.cc/KXA2-KEZM]. 
 87. See Meese & Oman, supra note 6, at 278–80 (collecting examples of such firms). 
 88. For an overview of coreligionist commerce and its legal challenges, see generally 
Helfand & Richman, supra note 5. 
 89. In reality, a small kosher butcher likely buys meat from a slaughterhouse that com-
plies with the kashruth rules. A major purveyor of kosher products, such as Hebrew National, 
however, would have extensive commercial ties, including with wholesale suppliers of ani-
mals for slaughter. 
 90. See, e.g., Wm. James Mortimer, The Coming Forth of the LDS Editions of Scripture, 
LDS.ORG (Aug. 1983), https://www.lds.org/ensign/1983/08/the-coming-forth-of-the-lds-editions 
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Problems may arise, however, in markets where religion dominates commerce. 
Consider Voltaire’s classic statement of the doux-commerce thesis: 
Go into the Royal Exchange in London, a building more respectable than 
most courts; there you will find deputies from every nation assembled 
simply to serve mankind. There, the Jew, the Mohammedan, and the 
Christian negotiate with one another as if they were all of the same reli-
gion, and the only heretics are those who declare bankruptcy; there the 
Presbyterian trusts the Anabaptist, the Anglican accepts the word of the 
Quaker. Leaving this peaceful and liberal assembly, some go to the syna-
gogue, others go to drink . . . .91 
In this vision, religion is not absent. Voltaire defines the market participants in terms 
of their religion. The commerce in which they engage, however, is not defined in 
terms of religion. Indeed, it is precisely because religion does not dominate com-
merce that the market provides an arena of peaceful cooperation despite religious 
and moral pluralism. 
Now consider a market in which religion dominates commerce. American history 
provides an example of such a society in nineteenth-century Utah. In 1847, respond-
ing to years of persecution, the Mormons migrated en masse to the Great Basin. Mo-
tivated in part by a vision of a godly society and responding in part to the exigencies 
of settlement in the arid West, the Mormon Church organized much of economic life 
along religious lines, distributing land and water rights as well as sponsoring various 
industrial projects.92 With the completion of the transcontinental railroad, church 
leaders redoubled their efforts to maintain Mormon economic independence, 
organizing boycotts of non-Mormon merchants, cartelizing Mormon-owned busi-
nesses, and actively discouraging the consumption of imported goods.93 Not surpris-
ingly, the Mormon quest for autarky exacerbated conflict between Mormons and 
non-Mormons, leading at times to violence and contributing to the fervor of the anti-
polygamy crusades of the 1880s, which ultimately resulted in the mass incarceration 
of Latter-day Saints94 and the near destruction of the Mormon Church.95 Tellingly, 
in the end the Mormons relied on commercial relationships with non-Mormons—
                                                                                                                 
 
-of-scripture?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/BB2D-XN8V] (recounting how the Mormon church 
hired Cambridge University Press to prepare an edition of its scriptures and the friendships 
and understanding that developed as a result). 
 91. VOLTAIRE, supra note 84, at 20 (footnote omitted). 
 92. The story of this religious economy is told in LEONARD J. ARRINGTON, FERAMORZ Y. 
FOX & DEAN L. MAY, BUILDING THE CITY OF GOD: COMMUNITY AND COOPERATION AMONG 
THE MORMONS 41–62 (Univ. of Ill. Press 2d ed. 1992) (1976). See also LEONARD J. 
ARRINGTON, GREAT BASIN KINGDOM: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS 
1830–1900, at 39–63 (1958). 
 93. See ARRINGTON, supra note 92, at 311–35. 
 94. “Latter-day Saint” is another name for Mormons, taken from the official name of the 
Mormon Church, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. 
 95. See Nathan B. Oman, Doux Commerce in the City of God: Trade and the Mormon 
Ideal of Zion 7 (William & Mary Law Sch., Research Paper No. 09-289, 2014), http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2520499 [https://perma.cc/96KH-AT5Y] (dis-
cussing conflict generated by the Mormon policy of religious autarky). 
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bankers and investors who had purchased bonds issued by the church—to mediate 
an end to the conflict between themselves and the federal government.96 
The Mormon Zion did not exhibit the characteristics that Voltaire lauded in the 
Royal Exchange. The doux-commerce theory requires a market in which religious 
identity does not dominate commerce. This doesn’t mean that religious identity must 
be abandoned, but trade must flow relatively freely across tribal frontiers. Reli-
giously themed businesses and religiously motivated conduct—even conduct that re-
stricts trade on the basis of religion—is unobjectionable but only so long as it does 
not threaten to undermine commerce as a process mediating social pluralism. Ulti-
mately, the market envisioned by the doux-commerce argument cannot be trans-
formed into a godly space. This doesn’t mean that it needs to be a secular space, 
affirmatively hostile to religion. Indeed, constructing the market in such terms is 
likely to breed resentment and hostility of precisely the kind that commerce is sup-
posed to ameliorate.97 The market, however, must be a pluralistic space, one to which 
all have relatively open access and in which all can readily find willing trading part-
ners beyond the tribes—religious, ethnic, political, moral, or sexual—that define 
their deepest identities. 
B. Doux Commerce and the Scope of Antidiscrimination Law 
The doux-commerce argument suggests that the scope of both antidiscrimination 
laws and religious exemptions from those laws should be empirically contingent. 
While it is sensitive to the role of markets in constituting public life, it does not insist 
that, to the extent possible, markets should conform to liberal-democratic norms. In-
deed, an effort to comprehensively impose such norms on market actors would be 
destructive, undermining much of the good that markets do. The doux-commerce 
argument does, however, require that markets be open to all and that, to the extent 
possible, a blasé attitude toward commerce be cultivated. It thus shares with the pri-
vate theory of the market at least a strong presumption that freedom of contract 
should order market activity.98 However, where the private theory of the market sees 
the value of freedom of contract precisely in the fact that it is voluntary, a realm in 
which private individuals may pursue their private agendas through private 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. See EDWARD LEO LYMAN, POLITICAL DELIVERANCE: THE MORMON QUEST FOR UTAH 
STATEHOOD 232–48 (1986) (recounting the role of friendly bondholders as intermediaries be-
tween church leaders and federal officials). 
 97. Louise Melling has argued that providing religious exemptions from anti-
discrimination laws will not serve to lessen social conflict around same-sex marriage. See 
Melling, supra note 41, at 185–87. In support of her claim, she points out that conscience 
exemptions guaranteeing that objecting medical professionals need not perform abortions have 
not lessened the social conflict around abortion. Id. at 186. The obvious problem with this 
argument is that it rests on an unobservable counterfactual. The social conflict around abortion 
might have been even more intense but for such exemptions. Certainly, it isn’t difficult to 
imagine that the abortion wars would be considerably more intense if objecting doctors were 
required by law to perform abortions or give up the practice of medicine. 
 98. See OMAN, supra note 9, at 23–39 (arguing that freedom of contract supports a doux-
commerce approach to markets); see also Oman, supra note 9, at 204–18 (arguing that contract 
law ought to be organized so as to support markets). 
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agreements, the doux-commerce theory values freedom of contract for three public 
and social, rather than private and individualistic, reasons. 
First, freedom of contract forces market participants to think very carefully about 
the desires of potential counterparties. As Adam Smith observed, “It is not from the 
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but 
from their regard to their own interest.”99 In pursuing their interests, however, the 
butcher, brewer, and baker must imaginatively enter into our world and understand 
our needs. This ability to see the world from another’s point of view is a key skill for 
operating in a pluralistic society. Thus, research suggests, for example, that in pre-
modern societies trust and cooperation increases as trade replaces subsistence agri-
culture as the basis of economic life.100  
Second, freedom of contract makes intertribal cooperation easier by lowering the 
stakes of collective action. Political institutions are designed to allow collective ac-
tion in the face of disagreement. Democratic deliberation creates a fictitious consent 
to political decisions. Frequently, however, political decision making is an incubator 
for suspicion and ideological extremism.101 By raising the spectre of a hostile and 
coercive order from which one cannot easily defect, politics tend to foster distrust 
and conflict. In contrast, commercial interactions tend to be less fraught precisely 
because market actors have less power over one another. It is thus easier for those 
with opposing political, religious, or ethnic allegiances to cooperate as trading part-
ners than as political partners because defection from such schemes is far easier than 
defection from political decisions. Freedom of contract makes the market regime of 
relative unanimity and easy defection possible, thereby fostering cooperation across 
tribal lines that would not be possible in a world of purely democratic decision mak-
ing. To the extent that we abandon freedom of contract as an ordering principle of 
the market, we raise the ideological stakes of commerce, increasing conflict. This is, 
in part, why the public theory of the market, with its allegiance to strong norms of 
dignity and recognition at the expense of freedom of contract, is potentially so 
destructive.  
Finally, freedom of contract allows for a flexibility in economic arrangements that 
historically has produced material prosperity on a scale unrivaled by any alternative 
means of organizing economic life.102 Material prosperity, in turn, tends to have an 
                                                                                                                 
 
 99. SMITH, supra note 2, at 18. 
 100. See generally Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst 
Fehr, Herbert Gintis, Richard McElreath, Michael Alvard, Abigail Barr, Jean Ensminger, 
Natalie Smith Henrich, Kim Hill, Francisco Gil-White, Michael Gurven, Frank W. Marlowe, 
John Q. Patton & David Tracer, “Economic Man” in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral 
Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 28 BEHAV. BRAIN SCI. 795 (2005) (summarizing 
experimental findings showing that when playing the so-called “Ultimatum Game” those 
engaged in subsistence agriculture offered more one-sided distributions than those engaged in 
trade, hunting, or other cooperative enterprises); Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel 
Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis & Richard McElreath, In Search of Homo 
Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS 
& PROC. 73 (2001) (same). 
 101. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: HOW LIKE MINDS UNITE AND 
DIVIDE (2009). 
 102. This is also why even a “public theory” of the market will continue to allow the bulk 
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ameliorative effect on a host of social evils from environmental degradation to the 
mistreatment of ethnic and other minorities.103 Economic prosperity even reduces the 
number of people executed for witchcraft.104 
Freedom of contract, however, is not the only concern that the doux-commerce 
theory has in structuring the market. Freedom of contract is important because of the 
kinds of social spaces and practices that it creates in the market, not because it reflects 
some primal, libertarian right or represents the satisfaction of revealed preferences.105 
The focus of the doux-commerce theory is social rather than individualistic. We are 
interested in markets as a set of social institutions and commerce as a social practice. 
A market, no matter how staunchly it upholds freedom of contract, from which 
groups are systematically excluded is for that reason a weaker and less valuable as-
pect of communal life. Markets are valuable because they foster cooperation in the 
face of disagreement, inculcate habits of toleration, and generate prosperity and op-
portunity. They cannot do this if they are the preserve of a favored tribe or group. 
Crucially, however, the doux-commerce argument’s concern with exclusion stems 
not from a strong vision of what human dignity demands but rather from the more 
modest ambition that commerce be maintained as a mechanism for managing plural-
ism and fostering peaceful cooperation. 
Consider the position of African Americans prior to the passage of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act. In the wake of Emancipation, numerous southern state legislatures 
passed “Black Codes,” which dramatically curtailed the power of freed slaves to con-
tract, excluding them from large segments of the market and subjecting their partici-
pation to pervasive white control.106 Reconstruction Congresses moved against the 
                                                                                                                 
 
of economic activity to be organized by freedom of contract. History has taught that the alter-
native is mass impoverishment. There will, obviously, be massive disagreements about the 
scope of freedom of contract that one must preserve to deliver acceptable levels of prosperity, 
but today no one seriously questions that material abundance is impossible without leaving 
the majority of economic activity to contract. 
 103. See generally BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC 
GROWTH (2005) (documenting the tight correlation between economic growth and diminished 
social conflict, discrimination, and other social ills); Susmita Dasgupta, Benoit Laplante, Hua 
Wang & David Wheeler, Confronting the Environmental Kuznets Curve, J. ECON. PERSP., 
Winter 2002, at 147 (discussing evidence that pollution and many forms of environmental 
degradation decrease as societies become wealthier). 
 104. See generally Edward Miguel, Poverty and Witch Killing, 72 REV. ECON. STUD. 1153 
(2005) (showing a strong correlation between poverty and witch killing in Tanzania); Emily 
Oster, Witchcraft, Weather and Economic Growth in Renaissance Italy, J. ECON. PERSP., 
Winter 2004, at 215 (finding the same result for Renaissance Italy). 
 105. Compare CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION 7 (2d ed. 2015) (arguing that contract law is required by the “liberal ideal” which 
states that “morality requires we respect the person and property of others, leaving them free 
to make their lives as we are left free to make ours”), with Oman, supra note 9, at 229–30 
(“Given the benefits that flow from markets, we have good reason for creating bodies of law 
that serve to sustain and strengthen markets. This is what contract law does.”). 
 106. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, 
at 199–200, 208–09 (1988). While the Reconstruction Congresses did move aggressively to 
improve the plight of freed slaves, one shouldn’t overstate their commitment to racial equality. 
They believed that African Americans were entitled to “political rights” and “civil rights,” but 
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Black Codes, but after Reconstruction southern legislatures—aided and abetted by 
the Supreme Court, which struck down much of the work of the Reconstruction 
Congresses as unconstitutional107—created a Jim Crow regime of de jure segregation 
in a host of areas such as public accommodations and transportation. Semi-
government-sanctioned violence further limited African American participation in 
economic life. Finally, racist norms and beliefs supported and strengthened the re-
gime. Libertarians and progressives argue over the extent to which Jim Crow resulted 
from government action or the failure of private markets.108 From the perspective of 
the doux-commerce thesis, however, the resolution of this debate is of limited inter-
est. Rather, what is important is that the exclusion of the African Americans from 
full participation in the market was undeniable and that the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
despite the fact that it did not ban discrimination in the market generally, massively 
expanded the ability of African Americans to engage in peaceful and productive 
commerce. 
In the eyes of the doux-commerce theory, the evil of racial discrimination is sys-
temic rather than individual. The refusal of any particular individual to contract with 
another individual is a natural result of freedom of contract and should not be made 
a legal wrong. The problem arises when discrimination is so systemic that its victims 
are unable to fully participate in commerce. Antidiscrimination laws are justified as 
a way of combating this systemic evil. The doux-commerce theory, however, does 
not provide arguments that justify banning discrimination as a way of vindicating an 
individual right to be free of public insults to one’s dignity. The goal of the doux-
commerce approach is peaceful cooperation in a pluralistic society, not universal 
bonds of fraternity or a deep mutual recognition. Consider a sign in a business de-
claring, “No blacks allowed.” If such signs are widespread and the sentiment that 
they express widely acted upon, then they undermine the ability of the market to 
deliver the benefits posited by the doux-commerce argument. On the other hand, if 
such signs are extremely rare and mark the business owner that posts them as a crank 
and a social pariah, then they do not threaten the beneficent possibilities of commerce 
and the doux-commerce theory provides no justification for banning them.  
One justification that the doux-commerce theory might offer for a more expan-
sive, individualistic, rather than systemic, approach to antidiscrimination laws is that 
such laws force market actors to trade across tribal and ideological boundaries. The 
ability of markets to foster cooperation and social interaction across such boundaries 
is one of their chief virtues. Aggressive antidiscrimination laws even in the absence 
of systematic exclusion, one might argue, seem to enhance this activity. Despite its 
initial plausibility, however, there are two reasons for rejecting this argument. The 
first is that it does a poor job of justifying any of the antidiscrimination laws that we 
                                                                                                                 
 
not “social rights,” an elastic category that justified de jure segregation of various kinds. See 
Bagenstos, supra note 70, at 1209–13 (briefly recounting this intellectual history and collect-
ing sources). 
 107. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (striking down the Civil Rights Act 
of 1875). 
 108. Compare EPSTEIN, supra note 67, at 126–27 (arguing that African American exclu-
sion from the market resulted from government action), with Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets 
Don’t Stop Discrimination, SOC. PHIL. POL’Y, April 1991, at 22 (arguing that unregulated 
markets inevitably result in widespread discrimination). 
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currently have. Those laws all have an asymmetrical structure.109 Employers may not 
refuse to hire an employee because of the employee’s religion, but employees are 
free to refuse to work for an employer because of the employer’s religion.110 Busi-
nesses, likewise, are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race, religion, 
gender, or sexual orientation, but customers are free to discriminate on that basis.111 
If the goal of antidiscrimination laws was simply to force individuals to trade across 
tribal boundaries, this asymmetry makes little sense.  
The second problem with this argument is that other aspects of the doux-
commerce approach are undermined when the refusal to contract is made into a legal 
wrong. The mutual understanding promoted by markets comes from more than the 
brute proximity promoted by commerce. Rather, trade requires market actors to con-
sider the desires and goals of their counterparties. This imaginative ability to see the 
world from another’s point of view is one of the reasons that commerce tends to have 
a corrosive effect on established social hierarchies. In a nation of shopkeepers no one 
can afford the haughtiness of an aristocrat who need not consider the goals of another. 
Likewise, seeing the world from another’s point of view lubricates interactions in a 
pluralistic society. Indeed it is an intellectual prerequisite for complying with most 
liberal conceptions of justice.112 Allowing a party, however, to demand as a legal 
right that another contract with him undermines this process.113 The holder of such a 
legal entitlement need not see the world from his counterparty’s point of view. It is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 109. But see CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.5(a) (West 2007) (stating that “[n]o business establish-
ment of any kind whatsoever shall discriminate against, boycott or blacklist, or refuse to buy 
from, contract with, sell to, or trade with any person in this state on account of any [protected] 
characteristics”). 
 110. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer—to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin . . . .”). 
 111. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (“All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal 
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of 
any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or seg-
regation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.”); but see CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 51.5(a) (prohibiting discrimination in purchasing by “business establishments”). Note, 
federal law does not prohibit discrimination in public accommodations on the grounds of 
gender, although California does. 
 112. See PETER BERKOWITZ, VIRTUE AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM 74–83 
(1999) (arguing that, for example, John Locke’s theory of justice requires certain dispositions 
of understanding others); OMAN, supra note 9, at 40–66 (discussing how markets foster mutual 
understanding). 
 113. The system of Spanish trade in colonial Latin America provides an extreme example. 
Under the repartimeiento de mercancias, conquered Incas were forced to purchase goods from 
Spanish merchants at prices set by the conquerors. See DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. 
ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 16–19 
(2012) (discussing Spanish economic practices in the conquered Inca Empire). Such an ar-
rangement provided little incentive for the Spanish merchants to understand their Inca “cus-
tomer,” nor did it make much sense for Incas to invest in learning about alternative suppliers 
to the Spanish “traders.” See id. 
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enough to invoke the fear of the courts. This is not a reason per se for rejecting anti-
discrimination laws, but it does suggest that such laws should not be justified on the 
basis of forcing individual market interactions. Such forced interactions lack the ca-
pacity to “gentle manners” in Montesquieu’s phrase. 
Applying this framework to antidiscrimination laws covering sexual orientation 
suggests that the value of such laws is empirically contingent. Gays and lesbians have 
undoubtedly been subject to violence and discrimination.114 In some places, being 
out may significantly limit one’s access to the market. In such places commerce can-
not function successfully in the way posited by the doux-commerce theory without 
legal intervention to ensure widespread access to goods and services in the market. 
However, in other places being a gay or lesbian does not represent a barrier to full 
participation in the market. This does not mean that the market in such places is free 
of all acts of discrimination. Rather, it means that in such places discrimination is 
rare and does not represent a threat to meaningful participation in commercial life. 
In such places, the case for antidiscrimination laws is quite weak. At best they serve 
a prophylactic function, ensuring that shifts in social norms don’t result in threats to 
market access. Their ability to fulfill this role, however, is undermined by the fact 
that the passage of antidiscrimination laws covering sexual orientation is generally a 
result of shifting social attitudes rather than a cause of those shifts. 
There are countervailing reasons that counsel in favor of granting religious 
exemptions, where antidiscrimination laws are adopted. Aggressively enforcing anti-
discrimination norms in the absence of threats to meaningful access can undermine 
the pluralism-managing force of markets. In such cases, antidiscrimination norms 
insist on a kind of normative recognition in the teeth of religious objections and then 
deploy the power of the state against objectors to extract that recognition. Such a 
course of action is more likely to exacerbate conflict rather than ameliorate it. Stated 
simply, society is not well served when markets become sites of religious martyrdom. 
Ideally, the market should resemble the idealized Royal Exchange of Voltaire not the 
Circus Maximus of Nero. To LGBT-rights activists, any suggestion that religious 
business owners are being persecuted for complying with antidiscrimination laws is 
ridiculous. Such laws, they insist, are not designed to punish believers but to vindi-
cate the rights of gay citizens. This response, however, misses the point. Within re-
ligious communities, those who face legal sanctions rather than engaging in conduct 
that they regard as sinful will be lionized as heroes and martyrs regardless of what 
gay-rights advocates say. History suggests that religious conduct that is legally sanc-
tioned becomes more, rather than less, religiously salient.115 When the market 
becomes the site where religiously motivated conduct is punished, commerce is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 114. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE 
CLOSET 58–83 (1999) (documenting violence and discrimination against gays and lesbians). 
 115. Examples could be endlessly multiplied. Think of the Old Believers and Orthodox 
believers in Russia who stubbornly clung to their beards. See ROBERT K. MASSIE, PETER THE 
GREAT: HIS LIFE AND WORLD 234–36 (1980) (recounting Peter the Great’s attempt to force 
Russians to shave their beards). Contemporary French efforts to ban students from publically 
wearing the hijab provide another example. See, e.g., Angelique Chrisafis, French PM Calls 
for Ban on Islamic Headscarves at Universities, GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2016, 7:23 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/13/french-pm-ban-islamic-headscarves-universities 
-manuel-valls [https://perma.cc/Y2SD-DZHQ]. 
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transformed into another front in the culture wars rather than a mechanism for 
managing pluralism. This doesn’t mean that the claims of religious believers should 
always triumph. As noted above, widespread access to the market must trump other 
concerns. Nevertheless, the doux-commerce theory provides reasons why religious 
exemptions are valuable if they do not threaten others’ ability to participate meaning-
fully in commerce.  
As an empirical matter, how common is discrimination by businesses against gay 
and lesbian customers? Sizeable majorities of Americans believe that gays and les-
bians face significant levels of discrimination.116 The research on discrimination 
based on sexual orientation, however, has overwhelmingly focused on employment 
and workplace discrimination.117 There has been surprisingly little research on the 
scope of discrimination by businesses against gay or lesbian customers. In her book-
length treatment of the economic lives of gays and lesbians, for example, M.V. Lee 
Badgett discusses discrimination against gay customers only briefly in passing, and 
in outlining legislative proposals to increase the economic well-being of gays and 
lesbians, she does not mention antidiscrimination laws targeting businesses’ interac-
tions with customers.118 To be sure, there is some evidence of such discrimination. 
In the past, governments have targeted businesses that catered to gays and lesbians.119 
Such legal impediments, however, have largely disappeared.120 Two “tester” studies 
attempted to show the extent of discrimination against gay customers. One study 
found no cases in which a business refused services to gay customers, although store 
attendants were slightly slower in approaching same-sex couples.121 The other study, 
this time of hotels, found that overtly gay customers were refused accommodations 
at somewhat higher rates than heterosexual couples, although the size of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 116. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC SEES RELIGION'S INFLUENCE WANING 16 (2014), 
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2014/09/Religion-Politics-09-24-PDF-for-web.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/R4KB-9DGT] (“About two-thirds of Americans think gays and lesbians face a lot of 
discrimination in the U.S. today (65%) . . . .”). 
 117. See S. REP. NO. 113-105 (2013), https://www.congress.gov/113/crpt/srpt105 
/CRPT-113srpt105.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY4M-Q53Z] (summarizing research on employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in response to the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 2013); M. V. LEE BADGETT, MONEY, MYTHS, AND CHANGE: THE 
ECONOMIC LIVES OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 20–51 (2001) (discussing the effects of 
employment discrimination on LGBT incomes). 
 118. See BADGETT, supra note 117, at 125 (discussing discrimination against gay 
customers). 
 119. See id. at 106 (“Until the 1960s, the expansion of these public sites of gay consump-
tion and identity formation was limited by police harassment, practices of extortion, laws 
against homosexual sodomy, and pressure from liquor control boards.”). 
 120. See, e.g., One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 
235 A.2d 12, 13 (N.J. 1967) (holding that the state liquor licensing authorities could not dis-
cipline gay bars because they permitted “apparent homosexuals to congregate”); see also 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (striking down as unconstitutional a law that 
the Court deemed to be motivated by antigay animus). 
 121. See Andrew S. Walters & Maria-Cristina Curran, ‘Excuse Me, Sir? May I Help You 
and Your Boyfriend?’: Salespersons’ Differential Treatment of Homosexual and Straight 
Customers, 31 J. HOMOSEXUALITY, nos. 1/2, 1996, at 135. 
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differential was unclear.122 The Pew Forum’s 2013 survey of LGBT Americans 
reported that twenty-three percent of respondents had “[r]eceived poor service in a 
restaurant, hotel, place of business” because of their sexual identity.123 The study, 
however, did not ask respondents whether they had ever been refused service. 
It is difficult to know what to make of the empirical evidence. The lack of research 
on discrimination by businesses is likely the result of a kind of intellectual triage by 
scholars interested in LGBT rights, focusing on employment because that is the area 
with the greatest impact on the economic well-being of gays and lesbians.124 Like-
wise, gays and lesbians may be able to avoid situations where they are refused service 
by cloaking their sexual identity or consciously avoiding businesses that discrimi-
nate.125 The fact remains, however, that there is no evidence of widespread denials 
of service to gay customers. Unlike African Americans in 1963, gays and lesbians 
do not seem to operate in a market where they face ubiquitous refusals by a large 
segment of businesses to serve them. There is evidence that discrimination in fields 
such as housing and employment have serious, negative consequences on the mate-
rial well-being of gays and lesbians.126 Likewise, there is evidence of subtle forms of 
discrimination against gay customers, but not of the sort that antidiscrimination laws 
can effectively remedy.127 Making rude service into a legal wrong is a fruitless en-
terprise. On the other hand slurs, verbal attacks, or threats can be more effectively 
addressed through the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress or the crimi-
nal law, if the threats rise to the level of assault.128  
Of course, it is unreasonable to demand that all laws be justified by 
comprehensive, empirical studies with statistically significant results. Often, 
lawmakers, of necessity, act based on anecdotes and less rigorous social observation. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 122. See David A. Jones, Discrimination Against Same-Sex Couples in Hotel Reservation 
Policies, 31 J. HOMOSEXUALITY, nos. 1/2, 1996, at 153, 155–57 (1996). The study involved 
contacting hotels via letter and soliciting a response via a self-addressed stamped envelope. 
The difficulty comes in how to interpret the many hotels that never responded to the query. 
The authors coded all of these responses as rejections, although some of them may have simply 
been hotels uninterested in the hassle of corresponding with potential customers. Id. at 158. 
 123. PEW RESEARCH CTR., A SURVEY OF LGBT AMERICANS: ATTITUDES, EXPERIENCES AND 
VALUES IN CHANGING TIMES 41 (2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/06/SDT 
_LGBT-Americans_06-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/EY4B-DAMF]. 
 124. The popular stereotype of gays and lesbians as affluent is complicated by fuller eco-
nomic data. See BADGETT, supra note 117, at 117–21. Lee Badgett attributes this difference to 
employment discrimination. See id. at 46–47. More recent data shows that while gay or lesbian 
individuals earn less on average than the population as a whole, gay couples earn more than 
heterosexual couples. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 123, at 27 (“Same-sex couples 
bring in an average of $107,000 a year, compared with $96,000 for opposite-sex married 
couples and $65,000 for opposite-sex unmarried couples [in 2011].”). 
 125. I am grateful to Lee Badgett for pointing out this possibility to me in an email 
exchange. 
 126. See BADGETT, supra note 117, at 20–50. 
 127. See generally Walters & Curran, supra note 121 (finding that store employees delayed 
approaching apparently gay or lesbian customers). 
 128. Cf. Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, 
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) (arguing in favor of a tort cause 
of action for extreme and insulting racist speech directed at individuals). 
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Given the historical animus against gays and lesbians, it is not unreasonable to 
suppose that laws outlawing discrimination by businesses against gay and lesbian 
customers would enhance their participation in commerce. My point, however, is that 
we should be careful about overstating the necessity for such laws. Indeed, while 
there are very few studies finding discrimination by businesses against gay or lesbian 
customers, there is an extensive marketing literature on how businesses can reach out 
to such customers.129 Much of this work is based on inaccurate hype generated by 
marketing firms about the purchasing power of gay or lesbian consumers, but it does 
suggest that, by and large, businesses are mainly interested in getting gay dollars 
rather than refusing gay customers.130 Even if one believes that it is implausible that 
market competition will eliminate discrimination against gay employees, the 
available evidence suggests that markets have done a fairly good job of eliminating 
denials of service to gay and lesbian customers.131 
The second empirical question is the likelihood that large numbers of religious 
believers would avail themselves of a religious exemption from antidiscrimination 
laws to avoid participating in same-sex weddings. Currently, there is no evidence of 
frequent denials of services by wedding-industry professionals to same-sex couples. 
One hundred and thirty-two thousand same-sex couples identified themselves as 
married in the 2010 Census.132 Of the tens of thousands of same-sex weddings that 
have occurred in the United States as of 2016, only a handful seem to have run into 
business owners with a religious objection to participating commercially in the nup-
tial festivities and sued them.133 The current evidence suggests that even among those 
with religious objections to same-sex marriage, very few people would deny services 
associated with same-sex weddings. Thirty-nine percent of Americans opposed 
same-sex marriage before Obergefell,134 and “[o]ne of the strongest factors underly-
ing views of same-sex marriage is religion, and the sense that homosexuality is in 
conflict with one’s religious beliefs.”135 Given the widespread religious opposition 
                                                                                                                 
 
 129. See generally Lisa Peñaloza, We’re Here, We’re Queer, and We’re Going Shopping! 
A Critical Perspective on the Accommodation of Gays and Lesbians in the U.S. Marketplace, 
31 J. HOMOSEXUALITY, nos. 1/2, 1996, at 9 (providing a critical summary of this literature). 
 130. See BADGETT, supra note 117, at 102–32 (providing a comprehensive critique of the 
myth of the affluent gay consumer). 
 131. Compare Sunstein, supra note 108 (arguing that markets will not eliminate employ-
ment discrimination), with BADGETT, supra note 117, at 38–45 (arguing that market competi-
tion will eliminate employment discrimination only slowly). 
 132.  PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 123, at 25. In 2010, there were fewer than 50,000 
legally recognized same-sex marriages performed in the United States. See id. at 25 n.6. The 
self-reported number, however, is a better indicator of the social—as opposed to the legal 
—salience of same-sex marriage. Also, because the wedding industry is involved with 
weddings regardless of whether they are legally recognized, the self-reported number is a 
better indicator of the potential scope of conflicts. The commitment ceremony at issue in the 
Elane Photography case, for example, arose before New Mexico recognized same-sex 
marriage. 
 133. See Koppelman, supra note 36, at 643. 
 134. PEW RESEARCH CTR., SUPPORT FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AT RECORD HIGH, BUT KEY 
SEGMENTS REMAIN OPPOSED 1 (2015), http://www.people-press.org/files/2015/06/6-8-15 
-Same-sex-marriage-release1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY3C-ZKNL]. 
 135. Id. at 3. 
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to same-sex marriage, we would expect there to be ubiquitous denials of service to 
gay couples if such beliefs were regularly translated into discriminatory commercial 
conduct. Such is not the case. 
Same-sex marriage is in its infancy, however. In all likelihood, the norms among 
the minority of religious believers that object to same-sex marriage are in the process 
of coalescing. Hence, it is possible that a strong norm of refusing to provide services 
to gay couples could develop among conservative religious wedding professionals. 
No such norm currently seems to exist, but one might object to granting religious 
exemptions from antidiscrimination laws on the ground that the law must nip such a 
norm in the bud before it can take root among conservative religious believers.136 
This is a valid concern to the extent that such a norm might result in significant prob-
lems of access to wedding-related services in regions dominated by conservative re-
ligious believers.  
Nevertheless, there are three reasons to be skeptical of this argument. First, legally 
punishing religiously motivated conduct is likely to make it more, rather than less, 
salient for religious believers, as it plays into well-established narratives of religious 
persecution by the state.137 This suggests that punishing religious behavior is likely 
to be counterproductive from the point of view of weakening religious norms around 
that behavior. Second, even were such a norm to become entrenched, religious ex-
emptions would still not threaten meaningful access to services in areas with rela-
tively few conservative religious believers. Third, there is reason to believe that such 
a norm is not currently taking root in conservative religious communities. One 
                                                                                                                 
 
 136. Professor Frederick Mark Gedicks has made this argument. See Koppelman, supra 
note 36, at 644 (recounting Gedicks’s argument). 
 137. But see Melling, supra note 41, at 191–92 (arguing that granting exemptions will slow 
the pace of social change). One might counter the claim that legally sanctioning religiously 
motivated conduct will tend to entrench that conduct’s religious salience by pointing to the 
example of Bob Jones University, which has formally renounced its prohibition against inter-
racial dating despite fighting the loss of its tax-exempt status over this prohibition to the 
Supreme Court. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1983). However, it 
is by no means clear that the loss of tax-exempt status hastened the change in Bob Jones 
University’s policy, which did not happen until 2000, three decades after the IRS initially 
moved against it. Having ideologically invested so much in the issue during the battles with 
the IRS, it is equally likely that government action slowed change at Bob Jones University. 
One might also believe that conservative religious groups will abandon their moral 
objections to homosexuality and same-sex marriage if they are not coddled with religious 
exemptions. Several religious traditions have, in fact, altered their teachings on sexual morality 
to accommodate shifting attitudes toward homosexuality and other sexual behavior. These 
groups, however, were not responding to antidiscrimination laws. Furthermore, religious 
norms around sexuality may prove particularly hardy. We are now two generations removed 
from the Sexual Revolution’s initial attacks on notions of chastity, which links licit sexual 
activity to heterosexual marriage, yet chastity remains an important moral ideal for many 
conservative religious believers. Sexual orientation presents a different set of challenges to 
this ethic, but it would be a mistake to suppose that conservative religious sexual moralities 
are epiphenomenal teachings that will be rapidly discarded. Continued opposition by some 
religious believers to the sundering of the link between marriage and licit sexual activity 
suggests that these teachings are considerably more durable than the flimsy racist theologies 
that have been almost universally abandoned over the same period. 
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researcher, for example, was unable to locate any hotels or bed-and-breakfasts that 
refused to provide services for a same-sex wedding in the very religiously conserva-
tive region of southern Utah.138 Slightly less than half of Americans support allowing 
those with religious objections to refuse to provide services to a same-sex wedding, 
but it appears that only a tiny fraction of Americans actually have any interest in 
denying services themselves.139 
Finally, we have reason to believe that there is regional variation both in the need 
for antidiscrimination laws and the way that religious exemptions might interact with 
those laws in practice. Given the paucity of data on discrimination by businesses 
against gay or lesbian customers, it is impossible to accurately quantify the regional 
likelihood of discrimination. The Pew Research Center’s study of the experience of 
LGBT Americans found that respondents in the South were roughly 50% more likely 
to report discrimination of any kind than respondents in the Northeast or Midwest.140 
Likewise, we know that religious opposition to same-sex marriage is not distributed 
evenly across the country.141 The irony is that religious exemptions from anti-
discrimination laws are least likely to be adopted in those jurisdictions where they 
pose the least threat, and antidiscrimination laws are least likely to be adopted in 
those regions where they would be needed most. As a practical matter, however, 
crafting limited religious exemptions from antidiscrimination statutes is probably the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 138. See Chapman, supra note 19, at 1821–22. It must be emphasized, however, that 
Chapman’s study made no attempt at systematic rigor and at best is a striking anecdote. 
 139. See Michael Lipka, Americans Split over whether Businesses Must Serve Same-Sex 
Couples, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/03/30 
/businesses-serving-same-sex-couples/ [https://perma.cc/B87D-NP9X] (noting that 47% of 
Americans would allow the business to refuse services and 49% would require the business to 
provide services). Rassmussen Reports ran a poll based on the Elane Photography facts in 
2013, 2014, and 2015 asking if the photographer has the right to turn down the job and reports 
85%, 73%, and 70% respectively of respondents in the three years favored the photographer. 
See Do You Want a Religious Freedom Law in Your State, RASMUSSEN REP. (Apr. 1, 2015), 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/march_2015/do_you 
_want_a_religious_freedom_law_in_your_state [https://perma.cc/K7UQ-CZT8]. It is possi-
ble that the respondents thought they were being asked the current state of the law rather than 
for their own opinion, although Rassmussen also reports that 19% of respondents in 2015 
“believe the Christian photographer should not have the right to turn down a same-sex wed-
ding job, while 12% are not sure.” Id. 
 140. The Pew report stated: 
LGBT adults living in the South are more likely than those living in the Northeast 
and Midwest to have experienced four or more of these incidents—29% vs. 18% 
for the Northeast and 19% for the Midwest. LGBT adults living in the West are 
not statistically different from any of the three regional groups in this regard 
(22% say they’ve experienced four or more of these incidents). 
PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 123, at 43. The “incidents” referred to consist of having ever 
“[b]een subject to slurs or jokes”; “[b]een rejected by a friend or family member”; “[b]een 
threatened or physically attacked”; “[b]een made to feel unwelcome at a place of worship”; 
“[r]eceived poor service in a restaurants, hotel, place of business”; and “[b]een treated unfairly 
by an employer” because of sexual orientation. See id. at 41. The survey did not ask about 
refusals of service. 
 141. See Chapman, supra note 19, at 1795–1801 (providing a detailed breakdown of reli-
gious and political attitudes towards same-sex marriage and homosexuality by state). 
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most likely route toward getting them adopted in regions where they may be 
needed.142 
This analysis suggests that the proper balance between antidiscrimination laws 
and religious exemptions will vary from community to community and from market 
to market.143 In places where there is widespread hostility to gays and lesbians, per-
vasive discrimination against gay customers may pose significant limits on the ability 
of gay citizens to participate in commercial life, although it is difficult to find evi-
dence of such markets. Such a market will have less ability to “gentle” manners, and 
its ability to facilitate peaceful cooperation will be significantly limited. In such 
places, there is a more compelling case for antidiscrimination laws. Furthermore, 
religious exemptions from those laws must be narrowly cabined if we are to maintain 
meaningful access to the market in areas where such exemptions would be routinely 
invoked. These are also communities where market forces are least likely to guaran-
tee meaningful access. If a significant portion of the population consists of religious 
believers that will invoke such exemptions, then they may need to be eliminated in 
their entirety. If, on the other hand, hostility to gay and lesbian customers by busi-
nesses is rare in the markets, then the case for antidiscrimination laws weakens con-
siderably. Likewise, in those markets, the case for religious exemptions is stronger. 
Such exemptions will be invoked infrequently, and their existence will not meaning-
fully threaten access to the market. Furthermore, these are also the situations in which 
market pressure is most likely to be effective in limiting religiously motivated 
discrimination.  
C. Objections and Responses 
Such a framework will necessarily result in laws whose coverage varies and will 
require lawmakers—whether legislative, administrative, or judicial—to make ad hoc 
decisions based on local circumstances. One might object that such an approach faces 
three difficulties: First, we lack clear criteria as to what constitutes “meaningful ac-
cess” and when that access is threatened. Second, antidiscrimination laws cannot cre-
ate meaningful changes in the market if their coverage isn’t complete. Third, such an 
approach fails to properly respect the dignity of either the victims of discrimination 
or conscientious objectors to antidiscrimination laws, whose sincerely held religious 
beliefs are violated.  
While I cannot claim to have an algorithm that specifies when discrimination 
                                                                                                                 
 
 142. The Utah experience is instructive here. Despite having an extremely conservative 
and religious population, the state legislature adopted an antidiscrimination law creating em-
ployment and housing protections for gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transsexuals. The law 
passed with the very active support of the Mormon Church. Exempting religious organizations 
from the law’s reach was key to creating the coalition in favor of its passage. See Laurie 
Goodstein, Utah Passes Antidiscrimination Bill Backed by Mormon Leaders, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/12/us/politics/utah-passes-antidiscrimination 
-bill-backed-by-mormon-leaders.html?_r=2 [https://perma.cc/D3CJ-CBYS]. Of course, the 
law does not deal with discrimination against customers, so it does not directly implicate the 
questions addressed in this article, but it does suggest a political dynamic that could result in 
greater legal protections for LGBT citizens.  
 143. See Laycock, supra note 66, at 197–201. 
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poses a threat to meaningful participation in the market, analogies to antitrust law 
can at least guide our judgments in this situation. Of course, because the goals of 
antitrust law center mainly on market efficiency, the analogy to the doux-commerce 
argument is imperfect, but it does provide a useful starting place. Federal antitrust 
law prohibits firms with market power from abusing that power. It thus requires both 
a definition of the market and a test for determining when a firm has market power. 
To massively oversimplify, antitrust law defines the given market for a firm as con-
sisting of those firms that can readily supply substitutes for the firm’s goods and 
services.144 Market power, in turn, is defined as “the ability to raise prices by restrict-
ing output.”145 These concepts can be applied in a very rough way to debates over 
the proper scope of antidiscrimination laws.  
When asking if discrimination poses a threat to meaningful access, we define the 
market as the sphere in which those similarly situated to the targets of discrimination 
normally shop. Of course, by assuming ever greater investment in searching for al-
ternative providers, the definition of the market can be expanded, and as the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged in the antitrust context, the precise contours of any given 
market are fuzzy.146 Using the behavior of similarly situated consumers not subject 
to discrimination, however, provides a baseline. In defining the market, it would be 
a mistake to impose on targets of discrimination heroic search requirements that we 
do not assume other market participants are shouldering. Evidence that discrimina-
tion has an effect on prices faced by gays and lesbians would provide powerful evi-
dence in support of the claim that discrimination threatens meaningful access.147 Dis-
crimination could also be said to threaten meaningful access when it imposes on gays 
and lesbians materially higher search costs than similarly situated participants in the 
market. Minor or de minimis additional costs do not threaten meaningful access. 
Concluding otherwise implies that every instance of discrimination, no matter how 
isolated or rare, threatens meaningful participation. On the other hand, demanding 
that additional search costs be substantial would create an unnecessarily heavy pre-
sumption against antidiscrimination laws.148 Hence, while the doux-commerce 
                                                                                                                 
 
 144. See 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST 
LAW § 5.02a (2002) (“Thus, a market is the arena within which significant substitution in 
consumption or production occurs.”). 
 145. Id. at § 5.01.  
 146. See United States v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 667 (1974) (expressing some 
doubt as to the precise scope of the market in relationship to a proposed merger); United States 
v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 359 n.36 (1963) (same); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
370 U.S. 294, 340–41 (1962) (same); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 
330–32 (1961) (expressing some doubt as to the precise scope of the market in the case of a 
contract challenged under the Clayton Act). 
 147. This is the approach taken in demonstrating the existence of substantial discrimination 
against gays and lesbians in the employment context. There, the guiding assumption is that 
wage differentials faced by gays and lesbians after controlling for other factors are evidence 
of discrimination. See BADGETT, supra note 117, at 45–47 (discussing the research on employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). 
 148. It is important to note that search costs and prices are in some sense substitutes for 
one another in this argument. Price differentials could be evidence of discrimination in the 
absence of increased search costs and vice versa. 
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argument has a strong presumption in favor of freedom of contract, it does not place 
unduly high hurdles in the way of justifying antidiscrimination laws. 
Proponents of a public theory might argue that just as any discrimination by the 
government among its citizens based on race, religion, gender, ethnicity, or sexual 
orientation is impermissible, any discrimination by market actors is also un-
acceptable. While there is an appealing conceptual purity to such a position, it would 
represent a radical departure from how antidiscrimination laws have typically been 
applied. First, those laws have always left huge classes of market actors unaffected. 
Most dramatically, employees and customers have never been subject to such laws. 
The racist who refuses to work for a black employer commits no legal wrong. The 
same is true if he refuses to patronize an African American–owned business. Like-
wise, Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act does not apply generally to all busi-
nesses.149 More subtly, determining the proper level of sanctions for violations of 
antidiscrimination laws always involves judgments about the acceptable level of dis-
crimination. The central insight of Gary Becker’s pioneering work on the economics 
of punishment is that, in setting sanctions, we are always making a judgment as to 
the acceptable level of some evil.150 Insisting on “meaningful access” to the market 
is not an algorithm but a rule of thumb, one that focuses our attention on the proper 
concern. Calls to eradicate all discrimination have an algorithmic character, but in 
light of experience and the limitations of the law as a system of social control, they 
cannot be taken seriously. 
Experience under the 1964 Civil Rights Act and antidiscrimination laws belies 
the claim that gaps in the coverage of such laws renders them ineffective. Without 
denying or belittling the barriers to opportunity faced by African Americans, the 
1964 Civil Rights Act has been incredibly successful in dismantling the system of 
segregated businesses and wholesale exclusion from much of economic life that 
characterized Jim Crow.151 Yet the scope of the 1964 Act was limited. Most tellingly, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 149. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2012) (“Each of the following establishments . . . is a place 
of public accommodation . . . any inn, hotel, motel . . . ; any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, 
lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consump-
tion on the premises . . . ; any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium 
or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and any establishment which is physically lo-
cated within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered . . . and which holds itself 
out as serving patrons of such covered establishment.”). 
 150. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in 
ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 1 (Gary S. Becker & William M. 
Landes eds., 1974). 
 151. See James J. Heckman & J. Hoult Verkerke, Racial Disparity and Employment 
Discrimination Law: An Economic Perspective, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 276, 281 (1990) 
(documenting the large jump in average wages for African Americans associated with the 
passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act). In historical terms, the system of formally segregated 
businesses in the South and elsewhere in the country collapsed so rapidly that Title II of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act garners very little scholarly or political attention today. See Lincoln L. 
Davies, Lessons for an Endangered Movement: What a Historical Juxtaposition of the Legal 
Response to Civil Rights and Environmentalism Has To Teach Environmentalists Today, 31 
ENVTL. L. 229, 305 (2001) (“Partially because the 1964 Civil Rights Act’s ban on segregation 
in public accommodations achieved success so quickly, the Act’s most powerful provision 
today is Title VII . . . .”). 
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it did not ban discrimination against customers on the basis of race in all businesses 
but only in hotels, restaurants, and places of public entertainment. The Supreme 
Court did hold in 1975 that the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which states that “[a]ll persons 
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right . . . to make and 
enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens,”152 prohibits racial discrimina-
tion in private contracting,153 but that law does not reach discrimination based on 
religion, gender, or national origin.154 The single greatest testament to the success of 
these laws, despite gaps in their coverage, is that there is no organized effort to ex-
pand Title II to cover all businesses. The issue has essentially no political salience 
today. Indeed, most people would be surprised to learn that federal law does not 
generally ban discrimination by retailers. Likewise, even legally sophisticated parties 
are surprised to learn that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which deals with 
public accommodations, does not ban discrimination on the basis of sex.155 The com-
bination of commercial pressure and antidiscrimination laws covering key sectors of 
the market is sufficient to ensure access. Indeed, antidiscrimination laws have always 
included exemptions of various kinds. Federal antidiscrimination laws exempt reli-
gious institutions from aspects of their coverage.156 Laws prohibiting housing dis-
crimination routinely exempt owner-occupied dwellings or small commercial 
units.157  
                                                                                                                 
 
 152. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012); see also § 1981(c) (“The rights protected by this 
section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment 
under color of State law.”). 
 153. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (finding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provided 
a private cause of action against a private, for-profit school that discriminated on the basis of 
race and upholding such authority); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459–60 
(1975) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provided a cause of action for private employment 
discrimination based on race independent of the cause of action provided under Title VII). 
 154. See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (“If respondent on 
remand can prove that he was subjected to intentional discrimination based on the fact that he 
was born an Arab, rather than solely on the place or nation of his origin, or his religion, he will 
have made out a case under § 1981.”). 
 155. See, e.g., Mike Dorf, Arizona SB 1062 Post-Mortem: Statewide, It Would Chiefly 
Have Licensed Sex Discrimination. That’s Right, Sex Discrimination, DORF ON LAW (Feb. 26, 
2014), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2014/02/arizona-sb-1062-post-mortem-it-would.html [https:// 
perma.cc/4Z7A-LFWZ] (“My first thought on making this discovery was ‘Really?’ It doesn’t 
violate federal law for a restaurant to keep out female customers? Holy crap! Why didn’t I 
know that?”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012) (“All persons shall be entitled to the full 
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and ac-
commodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without dis-
crimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.”). 
 156. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012) (“This subchapter [i.e., Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.] shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation, associ-
ation, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a 
particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, asso-
ciation, educational institution, or society of its activities.”); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987) (holding 
that the religious exemption to Title VII does not violate the Establishment Clause). 
 157. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64c(b)(1) (West Supp. 2016) (“The provisions of 
this section shall not apply to (A) the rental of a room or rooms in a single-family dwelling 
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Ardent supporters of the public theory of the market are likely to object that the 
doux commerce approach, by making the extent of both antidiscrimination laws and 
religious exemptions empirically contingent, fails to properly recognize the dignity 
of the individual. Chai Feldblum writes: 
If I am denied a job, an apartment, a room at a hotel, a table at a restau-
rant, or a procedure by a doctor because I am a lesbian, that is a deep, 
intense, and tangible hurt. That hurt is not alleviated because I might be 
able to go down the street and get a job, an apartment, a hotel room, a 
restaurant table, or a medical procedure from someone else. The assault 
to my dignity and my sense of safety in the world occurs when the initial 
denial happens. That assault is not mitigated by the fact that others might 
not treat me in the same way.158 
These objections are not without substance. The targets of religiously motivated 
discrimination can insist that for market actors to refuse to contract with them is 
humiliating. If the law tolerates such behavior, it refuses to protect gays and lesbians 
against these psychic harms.159 This refusal is an affront to their dignity. 
Notice, however, that the claims of individual dignity can be arrayed on both sides 
of the question. The conscientious objector can insist that an appreciation for indi-
vidual dignity demands that we accommodate religious conscience. To coerce or 
punish someone whose behavior is dictated by conscience fails to treat their choices 
and their religious identity with respect. Indeed, gay-rights advocates themselves re-
ject the idea that one can sanction or discriminate on the basis of homosexual conduct 
without discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.160 As Thomas Berg points 
out, “Religious liberty claims face similar attempts to dismiss them as conduct, sub-
ject to any and all state regulation.”161 The dignity of a religious believer told that 
                                                                                                                 
 
unit if the owner actually maintains and occupies part of such living quarters as his residence 
or (B) a unit in a dwelling containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by 
no more than two families living independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains 
and occupies the other such living quarters as his residence.”). 
 158. Feldblum, supra note 41, at 153. 
 159. See Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer’s Guide to the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171, 210 (1995) (“Discrimination has both instrumental 
and symbolic consequences. . . . [D]iscrimination is about insult and psychic injury as well as 
access to goods, and the state’s interest in avoiding those harms may be very strong indeed.”). 
 160. As Feldblum puts the point: 
Particularly as a means of dealing with the holding in Bowers v. Hardwick, some 
legal advocates had argued that their clients should not be discriminated against 
for the status of being gay, although they deliberately failed to claim equal non-
discrimination rights for their clients’ rights to engage in gay conduct. From the 
moment I became aware of this legal approach, I have detested it and argued 
against it. It seemed to me the height of disingenuousness, absurdity, and indeed, 
disrespect to tell someone that it is permissible to “be” gay, but not permissible 
to engage in gay sex. What do they think being gay means? 
Feldblum, supra note 41, at 142–43 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). 
 161. Berg, supra note 41, at 214. To her credit, Feldblum acknowledges this symmetry, 
nevertheless insisting that antidiscrimination laws should triumph over conflicting claims of 
religious believers’ dignity. See Feldblum, supra note 41, at 142–55. Other opponents of 
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she may have her beliefs in private but will be punished or driven out of business if 
she acts out those beliefs in her commercial life is not respected. Taken in purely 
individualistic terms, it is difficult to determine whose dignity suffers the greatest 
affront or even if the dignity of one actor can be traded off against another actor.162 
At worst, such disputes degenerate into mere tribalism, with “dignity” acting as little 
more than a label signifying the tribe with which the speaker most closely identifies. 
The indifference of the doux-commerce argument to the claims of personal affronts 
to dignity is thus a conceptual advantage, not a weakness.163 Peaceful and productive 
cooperation in a pluralistic society is a sufficiently ambitious goal. 
In fairness, I should note that there is nothing in the doux-commerce theory that 
limits this analysis to discrimination based on sexual orientation.164 Consider Title II 
of 1964 Civil Rights Act, which bans racial discrimination in public accommoda-
tions. In his concurrence in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, which up-
held the constitutionality of the 1964 Act, Justice Goldberg quoted the Senate 
Commerce Committee: 
 The primary purpose . . . is to solve this problem, the deprivation of 
personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to pub-
lic establishments. Discrimination is not simply dollars and cents, ham-
burgers and movies; it is the humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment 
                                                                                                                 
 
religious exemptions, however, have acknowledged the problem of limiting gay rights to a 
purely private sphere while failing to recognize the symmetrical structure of religious believers 
concerns with a purely privatized or internal religious faith. Compare Underkuffler, supra note 
41, at 2077 (“If the discrimination [against a religious person] is truly rooted in the individual’s 
conduct, and not in religious affiliation or identity, then it is not odious discrimination in the 
way that term is understood here.”) (emphasis in original), with id. at 2082 (arguing that 
“[c]onduct may be part of gay or lesbian sexual orientation, but that conduct is simply an 
expression of who that person is” and that “‘[h]atred’s targeting of status is primitive, and its 
condemnation of behavior an ideologically inspired afterthought’” (quoting RICHARD MOHR, 
A MORE PERFECT UNION: WHY STRAIGHT AMERICA MUST STAND UP FOR GAY RIGHTS 65–66 
(1994)). 
 162. As should be clear from the proceeding section, I don’t believe that it is impossible to 
make defensible choices in favor of the claims of one group or another. I am skeptical, how-
ever, that we can do so based on competing individual claims to affronted dignity. Cf. 
Koppelman, supra note 36, at 620 (arguing that antidiscrimination laws should be thought of 
as a tool for systemic social engineering rather than providing individual recourse for a tort-
like wrong). 
 163. I admire the intellectual honesty of both Thomas Berg and Chai Feldblum in forth-
rightly acknowledging the symmetrical structure of claims by gays and lesbians and religious 
believers. I find it striking that while their analysis is very similar, they come to diametrically 
opposed conclusions, and I do not believe that either of them offers a compelling reason 
grounded in concern for personal dignity for preferring the claims of one group over those of 
the other. 
 164. See Melling, supra note 41, at 180–83 (accusing those favoring religious accommo-
dations of refusing to apply their analysis to antidiscrimination law outside of the context of 
sexual orientation); Underkuffler, supra note 41, at 2083 (same). But see EPSTEIN, supra note 
67, at 1–12 (criticizing antidiscrimination law generally); Epstein, supra note 67, at 1246–49 
(same). 
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that a person must surely feel when he is told that he is unacceptable as 
a member of the public . . . .165 
The system of racial segregation attacked by Title II was deeply unjust. In this, I 
agree with Justice Goldberg. The injustice, however, did not arise from the fact that 
occasionally African Americans encountered racist business owners that denied them 
service.166 To that extent, I believe Justice Goldberg was mistaken.  
Rather, the injustice of segregation in the market arose from the fact that African 
Americans had to operate in a society in which there were pervasive denials of their 
access to goods and services. The problem was not individual acts of discrimination, 
but a market so infested with institutions and practices based on white supremacy 
that it denied African Americans meaningful economic opportunity.167 Furthermore, 
given the pervasiveness of discrimination against African Americans, Congress was 
correct to grant only very limited religious exemptions from the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act. It is difficult to know for certain, but given the common religious justifications 
for segregation, coupled with the reality of pervasive discrimination by employers 
and businesses, it would have been reasonable to suppose that more generous ex-
emptions would have been widely invoked. 
Such conclusions, however, are empirically contingent. If I may be forgiven a 
personal example, as a college student I was explicitly told by a landlord that he did 
not wish to rent to me because of my religion. Notwithstanding the landlord’s action, 
however, I continued to operate in a world where the market provided me with ample 
opportunities. This was literally a once-in-a-life-time experience that did not mean-
ingfully restrict my ability to lead a productive and prosperous life. In short, my po-
sition was emphatically different than the position of an African American turned 
away from a lunch counter in 1963. This does not mean that vicious verbal attacks 
on individual dignity should be left without a legal remedy. The proper remedy for 
such attacks, however, lies with torts such as the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.168 Indeed, elsewhere, I have been critical of the Supreme Court’s limiting of 
such torts on free-speech grounds.169  
                                                                                                                 
 
 165. 379 U.S. 241, 291–92 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-872, 
at 16 (1964)). 
 166. Indeed, encountering those with objectionable opinions is part of living in a pluralistic 
society, and generally free speech values keep us from providing legal relief from “the humili-
ation, frustration, and embarrassment” that a person feels “when he is told” something by an-
other. Even speech torts like intentional infliction of emotional distress require greater indi-
vidualized harm than Justice Goldberg suggests here. 
 167. This point should be clear when one considers the concerns that remain for African 
American equality in a world in which businesses willingly provide them with services, but 
where deficiencies of educational and economic opportunity continue to condemn millions of 
black citizens to poverty. 
 168. Richard Delgado, for example, has argued that when individuals are subject to ex-
treme and targeted racial insults, they should be given a tort cause of action. See Delgado, 
supra note 128, at 134–35. 
 169. See Nathan B. Oman & Jason M. Solomon, The Supreme Court’s Theory of Private 
Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 1109, 1125–57 (2013) (attacking the Supreme Court’s decision in Snyder 
v. Phelps, which denied individual recourse by the targets of vicious homophobic attacks by 
the Westboro Baptist Church). 
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The humdrum, ideologically blasé world of commerce has its own dignity, not 
because it instantiates some thick account of what it means to respect someone’s 
deepest identity but because it allows for peaceful cooperation in the face of perva-
sive disagreement on deeper questions. Hence, while the doux-commerce argument 
provides no way of prioritizing the claims of affronts to individual dignity, it can 
balance the claims of antidiscrimination and religious conscience. It does so, how-
ever, socially and in terms of the market as a whole rather than any particular indi-
vidual.170 The targets of religiously motivated discrimination are entitled to protec-
tion when their ability to participate fully in the market is threatened. In such cases, 
the dignity of religious objectors must be subordinated to the requirements of peace-
ful commerce. Doing so, however, is not a judgment on the value of their personal 
dignity but on the effects of their behavior on the shape of the market. Likewise, 
where gays and lesbians enjoy broad access to goods and services and religious ob-
jectors to providing wedding cakes or nuptial photographs are rare, the doux-
commerce argument provides no reason for punishing those who refuse to contract 
on the basis of religious belief. This is not a judgment as to the worth or dignity of 
gays and lesbians. Rather, it is a judgment that the market is functioning as it should 
and that in the end ordinary commercial intercourse will do more to soften the edges 
of religious conviction than will fines and lawsuits.171 
CONCLUSION 
Discussions of law and religion should encompass more than debates about the 
relationship between church and state. In the modern world, much of the regulatory 
energy of the state is devoted toward shaping the character of the market. Not sur-
prisingly, many of the flash points in current debates over law and religion arise in a 
commercial context. We face questions not merely of whether and how the state may 
regulate religious conduct or whether and how the state’s conduct may be infused 
                                                                                                                 
 
 170. The doux-commerce argument for antidiscrimination laws is analogous to 
representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review, which argues that courts should overturn 
ordinary political outcomes only to keep open the channels of the democratic process. See 
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
Analogous to constitutional arguments made by John Ely and others, I am arguing that the 
purpose of antidiscrimination laws is not to eradicate individual encounters with prejudice in 
the marketplace, but to clear the channels of commerce to ensure that all have meaningful 
access to the market. Notice that in both arguments, the redress of individual rights violations 
is subordinated to systemic concerns. Cf. Laycock, supra note 66, at 200 (arguing that religious 
believers cannot be allowed to close off “choke points” in the market based on their religious 
beliefs). I’m grateful to my colleagues Tara Grove and Allison Larsen for pointing out this 
connection.  
 171. Such a view isn’t, of course, neutral in any absolute sense. It assumes that neither 
same-sex couples nor religious objectors to same-sex marriage are so depraved that they must 
be driven from the public view or from the polity entirely. Such a judgment will offend zealots 
convinced that their cultural opponents must be suppressed or confined to the private sphere. 
Cf. Feldblum, supra note 41, at 130–34 (arguing that antidiscrimination laws covering sexual 
orientation cannot be understood as being entirely neutral on the morality of homosexual acts 
precisely because they allow at least for the toleration of such acts). Doux commerce is a way 
of handling deep pluralism rather than suppressing or minimizing it. 
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with religious content. We must also confront the question of how religion ought to 
relate to commercial life. What is the proper relationship between church and 
market?  
Because markets are social creations, the laws that shape the market will deter-
mine the relationship between religion and commerce. To be sure, other factors—not 
the least of which is the content of the religious beliefs that command a significant 
following in society—will also determine this relationship.172 Nevertheless, every 
time the law regulates religious conduct in the market, it is consciously or un-
consciously instantiating a view of how religion ought to relate to commerce. My 
central goal in this Article is to explicitly articulate what I take to be the implicit 
assumptions that frequently determine conclusions about how religious conduct in 
the market ought to be regulated, and defend my favored approach. The public and 
private theories that I have articulated are interpretive reconstructions rather than 
summaries of the positions explicitly espoused by others. Something like these as-
sumptions, however, seems to lie behind many people’s intuitions about these ques-
tions. On one side is the effort to extend liberal-democratic norms of institutional 
legitimacy into the market. On the other side are those who argue that markets ought 
to be creatures entirely of contract. As an alternative to these two approaches, I have 
articulated a doux-commerce theory that sees markets primarily in terms of their so-
cial functions but does not tie those functions to the instantiation of liberal-
democratic norms.  
Applying these three approaches to current debates about same-sex marriage, 
antidiscrimination laws, and religious accommodations yields three quite different 
results. The public theory is ambiguous. For some it counsels in favor of the aggres-
sive application of antidiscrimination laws regardless of the background market con-
ditions. Others argue that the liberal norms that ought to constrain market actors im-
ply that religious conduct in the commercial sphere must be protected. The private 
theory by and large rejects the legitimacy of antidiscrimination laws as interfering 
with freedom of contract. The doux-commerce theory offers empirically contingent 
answers, depending on both the level of discrimination within society and the extent 
to which members of society hold particular religious beliefs. At the heart of this 
empirical balancing is the conviction that markets must be open to all but that eroding 
freedom of contract tends to undermine the ability of commerce to perform important 
work in a pluralistic society. Likewise, a pervasively religious market or one sharply 
divided along lines of identity poses its own threats to the ability of commerce to 
“gentle” our manners and promote peaceful cooperation. The goal is commerce 
where religious people are free to contract as they see fit, including on the basis of 
their religious convictions, but where religion does not dominate the market. Ideally, 
the law should facilitate a world where the majority of market actors take a distinctly 
blasé attitude toward religious, moral, ideological, and other differences. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 172. For example, of necessity, the relationship between religion and commerce will look 
different if Amish rather than Muslims are the dominant religious group. The former as a 
matter of faith eschew much of commercial life while the faith of the latter is arguably particu-
larly hospitable to commerce. 
